Read Ebook: The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis A History with Documents by Nordlund Karl

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B. Acts.

Not till the present day has the Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis presented itself in the eyes of Europe in a thoroughly acute phase. Its origin, in reality, dates as far back as the foundation of the Union itself.

The original cause of the agitating union disputes has been that Sweden, from the very commencement of the Union, has internationally borne the responsibility for the same, in other words, conducted the political affairs of both Kingdoms. The inequality produced hereby, the Norwegians on their part have striven to efface. Sweden has also for a long time shown herself willing to establish full equality in the Union, at the same time that she has accommodated herself to Norway in questions of detail. As far back as 1835 it was acknowledged, on the part of Sweden, that Norway's position in the Union was not in accordance with the claims of equity. Thus by a Royal Decree that year the Norwegian Minister of State at Stockholm was admitted into the Swedish so-called Ministerial Council to take part in foreign matters which concerned Norway. In 1839 the first great Union-Committee was formed, and both in this one, and two later--the last 1895-98--Norway was offered from the Swedish side complete equality in the Union on certain conditions. Added to this Sweden has on several occasions granted partial concessions. Some have been accepted by Norway--as for instance the law passed in 1844 concerning equality in Government Symbols etc. etc.--others again were refused--as the offer in 1885 and 1891 of increased influence in the administration of Foreign affairs. If offers of equality worded in more general terms are added--as in 1893 and during the present year--, NANSEN'S characterising Sweden's Union policy as >>90 years' labour to procure a supremacy for Sweden>>,--ought to appear in its true colours.

The accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to acquire the supremacy have, time after time, arisen from a mixture of various matters, partly the different conceptions of the legal character of the existing Union, partly the different programmes for the reformation of the Union.

Owing to the very indistinct and confused wording in the legal documents of the Act of Union the Swedish and Norwegian conceptions of the Union itself have finally become so antagonistic to each other, that the unionistic transactions have, in an excessive degree, taken the character of a continual judicial process, and the real questions have been more or less ignored. Swedish Policy on its part has always maintained that Sweden's supremacy in the Union is based on legal grounds. It has especially insisted that the administration of Foreign affairs was, from the first, placed in Sweden's hands, and this Swedish standpoint has also been acknowledged as the right one by the most eminent of Norwegian writers on State law. But of late those on the Norwegian Left Side have made stronger and stronger efforts to prove, that the order existed on no legal grounds, that Norway, as a Sovereign Kingdom, had the right, for instance, to create an entire Foreign Office of its own. And under this influence the Norwegian sensitiveness has in Sweden's defence of her conception of Union Law persisted more and more in seeing insulting >>designs of supremacy>>.

The connection of the Norwegian Union with the inner party struggles in Norway, has had a disastrous effect on the development of the Norwegian programme, especially since 1885.

Through the Constitutional Crisis in 1884, when the Royal Powers were forced--practically if not legally--to capitulate in essentials to the orthodox parliamentarism, the Norwegian party champions became in need of new programmes upon which to fling themselves. It was then, that the Norwegian radicals through the demand for their own Minister of State for Foreign Affairs cast a firebrand into the very midst of the Norwegian people, who to that time had stood unanimous towards the claim of a mutual Foreign Minister of State for the Union. In the struggle for the political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords became more and more rife. The national sensitiveness, already considerable, became excited to the utmost under the influence of the suggestive eloquence of BJ?RNSON and other agitators. The suspiciousness disaffection towards Sweden increased. The Swedish brethren were pointed at by BJ?RNSON as the only enemy Norway had, and even in the schoolrooms and school-books their hereditary enemy was spoken of with curses. Simultaneously the >>Norwegians of the Future>> buried themselves deeper and deeper in the study of >>Ancient Glorious Norway>>. Imagination was fed on Norwegian heroic Sagas and Viking exploits, and the ancient National Saint of Norway, Olaf the Holy, was unearthed from his long-forgotten hiding place for renewed worship.

This overwrought sentimental policy, of course, caused national pride and all its requisite claims, to raise a cloud over Sweden and the Union, and the essential principles in the Union Question became of less and less importance. How totally void of essential principles the recent Norwegian Union Policy has been, is most obvious in the matter of effacing the Union Symbol from the mercantile flag having for a long period of years played a dominating r?le in Norwegian party politics. It became the more and more hopeless task of Sweden and the Union King to maintain the cause of the Union without support from the dominant left party in Norway. The Norwegian radical party in their blind fanaticism were scarcely capable of rational action with any feeling of real political responsibility; the friendly attitude towards Russia as their friend in need, of BJ?RNSON and other radicals, was quite sufficient proof of this. It is true, that one party--the Norwegian Right Side--, for a long time inclined to a more favourable view of the Union, has supported the King in his efforts to oppose the dissolving of the Union, but in the fight for the political supremacy, the power of nationalism over minds has gradually undermined its position as a pillar of the Union, and at the present period of violently agitated feeling, the party has almost entirely vanished from the >>national junction.>>

During the process of this chauvinistic hysteria, Swedish politicians have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting into the hands of the Storthing , a risk that has at the present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt.

FOOTNOTES:

NANSEN . The same author writes : >>Finally in 1903 the Swedish Government declared openly that the present arrangement was not in accordance with Norway's just demands for equality in the Union.>> How such a statement can be made is simply incomprehensible.

How the Norwegian Storthing, made up as it is, of large numbers of lawyers, has contributed to this, is well known to all.

On this account, it has especially been vindicated that the Act of Union plainly indicates a joint Foreign Policy, which is scarcely possible without a joint Foreign Administration; that the same Act of Union only acknowledges the Swedish Foreign Minister of State as the head of the Foreign Administration for the Union; that in the >>Eidswold Constitution>>, at the commencement of the Union, the paragraph referring to the Norwegian Foreign Minister of State was simply ignored. This last inconvenient fact is interpreted by the modern Norwegian theory of State Law as implying, that the Norwegian Constitution has left the administration of Foreign affairs to the King personally, who, in his turn on the grounds of this authority has placed it in the hands of the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. NANSEN The artfulness of this legal construction becomes immediately obvious. It is exceedingly remarkable also to find that Norwegian parliamentarism can commit such a blasphemy towards the Constitution, that it has confered a position of importance on the King Himself.

The Norwegian Right Side has not either emphatically disputed the Swedish conception.

Sweden has especially tried to annul the paragraph 25 of Norway's fundamental law which limits the duty of its Union defence. According to this paragraph, the Yeomanry and other Norwegian troops, that cannot be reckoned as belonging to the line, may not be employed outside the boundaries of the Kingdom. This law has proved so much the more pernicous, as the Norwegians by their recruiting regulations have illoyally withdrawn from the Union-defence part of their fighting forces, by outrageously entering into the line a limited number only of the annual classes of recruits.

Mr HAGERUP also affirmed openly in the Storthing of 1904 that the Union question had in quite too high a degree come to be regarded by the Norwegian parties as a workshop of weapons for elections campaigns.

We get a glimpse of this romance, in the midst of the ultra modern >>glorious>> revolution. At a large meeting at Hamar it was decreed, that the new King should bear a name after one on the ancient Kings of Norway. In a festival number of a >>Vordens Gang>> in honour of the revolution we find printed a >>Psalm on Olaf's Day>> written by BJ?RNSON.

That Norway in carrying out the law respecting the flag, broke an agreement with Sweden made in 1844, was of course only in conformity with everything else.

The Consular Question is a red thread running through the history of the Union struggles during the last fourteen years--

The Norwegians on their part in attempting to defend the way in which the Left Side started the Union Policy in the beginning of 1890, always allude to what happened in Sweden in 1885.

What was it then that happened in 1885?

There was a cautious beginning with >>their own Consuls>>; it was too venturesome a task to begin the system at once with the question of their own Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Norwegian separatists, among others MICHELSEN himself, long ago, in a moment of rare sincerity, have acknowledged that other motives besides the practical have been at the root of the claim for reform. A Norwegian Consular Service meant, in itself, a step in the direction of the rupture of the bonds of Union, and was therefore even then an object worth striving for. But it was also openly declared, that a Norwegian Consular Service would necessarily be succeeded by a Norwegian diplomatic representation and a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. >>Directly they have got the wedge fixed into the small end>>, wrote in 1892 President HANS FORSSELL, >>they will try to persuade us that there will be no danger in letting them drive it in a bit>>. Above all they considered that a Norwegian Consular Service would by degrees disorganize the administration of the Foreign Office, and on the grounds of the dominating r?le interests of economy play in the Foreign politics of our day, it would by degrees expand into a regular Norwegian Foreign Office.

The chief characteristic of this programme is the total absence of any motive for it from a Union point of view. Modern Norwegian Nationalism has only really thought of Sweden and Norway, but not of the Union and its claims. Whenever Sweden has ventured to advocate the cause of the Union, Norway has begun to talk of the interests of Sweden. If, at any time, the claims of the Union have been discussed in Norway, they have usually been identical with those of Norway. The interests of the Union demanded that Norway, without further parley, got what its national sensitive feeling was pleased to decree as the Sovereign Norway's right. That is about the gist of the matter. The Norwegian policy has by degrees become blind to the fact, that the interests of the Union ought to demand a subordination of the inclination to decide arbitrarily on points touching the Union, both for the sake of Sweden and--of Norway.

Through its leader, EMIL STANG, the Norwegian Conservatives supported the Union King's view that the matter was as yet too imperfectly developed, and that it must be decided on in a joint Cabinet. But in 1892 the Storthing resolved, with a majority of 14 votes, on the establishment of a Norwegian Consular Service. The King was prepared to refuse the sanction to this, in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, and then and there began the conflict between King and Council, as witnessed by the events of later times. The character of this conflict may be mentioned already here, as Norway, in fact, was even then, in 1892, on the eve of the revolution, which has now broken out.

Even in 1892 the Radical Cabinet STEEN did not venture to carry the Consular question to an extreme. They were contented to play with fire. Before the King found an opportunity to give his definite answer to the consular question, the Cabinet retired. The Ministerial strike recently set on the political stage, was even then in the perspective. But the King having vainly tried to form a Conservative Ministry and matters becoming serious, a retreat was sounded, the Storthing itself taking the initiative, this time, strange to say, receiving the hint from Mr MICHELSEN. The requests of the Ministers to resign were withdrawn, and the Consular Question was postponed to a future date. The Norwegian masses were not as yet sufficiently impregnated with the gospel of the dissolution of the Union--and Norway was not yet armed for defence.

In the Spring of 1895 the situation in Norway was such that a complete standstill was threatened, and all sorts of extravagant plans were mooted on the Norwegian Radical Side. It was then that in limited Swedish Conservatives circles a plan was said to exist for making Norway come to an agreeable settlement of the Union question, by main force. This is a matter impossible to decide. These reports spread like wildfire, and had the effect of oil upon fire. And now at last Norway begins to think of her defence which of late years she has neglected.

The Norwegians meanwhile gave in as Norway was not ready. The Storthing in Norway also consented to what Sweden had all along endeavoured to obtain, viz. a general settlement. The Union Committee 1895-1898 effected a couple of year's truce; any real results were not to be expected. The Norwegian Radicals had other plans than a reasonable settlement of the Union question; its representatives in the Committee were bound by their party programme, and insisted on having their own Minister for Foreign affairs. On the other side, the two representatives of the Swedish Conservatives maintained the demand for a Union Parliament which the Norwegians in the previous Union Committee had refused. The Swedish and Norwegian majorities were very nearly balanced. They were united in the opinion that the Union necessarily demanded a joint Minister for Foreign affairs, but differed in everything else on several points. For instance, the Norwegian majority, characteristically would not agree to limit the possibility for Norway of withdrawing of her own accord, a greater or smaller portion of Norwegian troops from the defending forces of the Union. In the Consular question there were also differences. The Swedish members were unanimous in insisting on a joint Consular Service for both Kingdoms. The Norwegian majority preferred, from all points of view, a joint Consular Service to a separate one for each Kingdom, and strongly emphasized the point that in all circumstances the consuls ought to be personally and immediately under the control of the Minister for Foreign affairs, as the limits in the sphere of operations between the Consuls and the Diplomatic Officials became more and more indefined. But with evident respect to the opposing Norwegian opinions, it tried to regulate the Consular Service, by joint terminable laws, nevertheless, so worded, that not till the lapse of 15 years, the Kingdom that so desired, might have the right to dissolve the joint Consular Service.

FOOTNOTES:

Compare NANSEN .

The Norwegians, as aforesaid, have generally looked upon Sweden's maintaining its conception of the Union law as something very criminal; this has been Norway's right alone.

Compare NANSEN . >>The change in the Swedish Constitution in 1885 has therefore become the principal cause of the last twenty years' strife in the union.>>

Compare NANSEN .

It is a singular coincidence, that Norway in these days, when it has brought the Consular question to a climax, has begun to carry out a general rise in the Fiscal rates; the mercantile interests of >>the land of Free Trade>> Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all.

Compare No. I ?? 5, 15, 30, 31.

The Swedish majority had contemplated a provision in the Act of Union, wherevy it became incumbent for both Kingdoms to place a fixed minimum of fighting forces to the disposition of the Union.

NANSEN says >>Divisions arose partly over the resistance from the Swedish side to the unanimous demand of the Norwegian delegates for a separate Consular Service.>> This is, as plainly apparent, an extremely modified version of the truth.

In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt. The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom and independence. It was certainly on that account that their courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been acceptable.

But Mr LAGERHEIM'S experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable difficulties through which to pilot its way.

In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since deviated in any way.

In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the negotiations, it was necessary that it contained safe guarantees that the Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union.

But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:r IBSEN'S aforesaid inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day. >>As to one's rights, no one negotiates>>. This has become well nigh the axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to one and all of her demands.--

In a joint Cabinet Council held on January 21et 1902, it was resolved to convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two Norwegian authorities, who were to institute an examination as to how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present joint diplomatic representatives.

The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability of the arrangement, or of the political importance that might be assigned to the same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain circumstances and nothing more.

The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution; a corps acting for the most part under authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be an >>anomaly>>. The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the Norwegian interpretation of the Constitution; they do not approve of it, nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the advantages to be obtained, from an disciplinary point of view, by continuing to allow the separate consuls to act under the administration of the Minister for Foreign affairs.

The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving instructions directly to the different consuls; his 'wishes' were first to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of Foreign affairs should be complied with. And the Minister of Foreign affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian Consular Service would >>duly value the importance of a loyal co-operation.>>

It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any reference to them be made on Norway's part without further notice, the Committee itself having shirked the most salient points, namely those of a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee's conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish side for the solution of the question.

Mr. BOSTR?M became Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well known so-called Communiqu?.

This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments themselves, but only by different members in each, and that the Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter.

With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare that a dissolution of the joint Consular Office, appears to them, in itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be >>not impossible>> that under certain circumstances a system with different Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the most important advantage of the political agreement between the two countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the question on the following basis:

It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other. The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms.

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