Read Ebook: The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis A History with Documents by Nordlund Karl

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It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other. The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms.

When the Communiqu? was issued, it was received with very great diversity of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the agreement, on which considerable divergence of opinion was held, contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give some enlightenment on the point.

The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was entitled to appoint one without agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her assumed rights in the matter.

In other words, was it the intention of the Communiqu? to force Norway to a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands?

Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communiqu?? It is evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by Sweden, touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of the Communiqu? must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of authority.

How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing could interpret the Communiqu? as it did?

As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it is impossible to make any definite assertions.

FOOTNOTES:

It is undoubtedly Russia's proceedings in Finland which have especially influenced the recent unionist-political views of BJ?RNSON.

The most effective power in the Committee was D:r SIGURD IBSEN, who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of the Committee's debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish Ambassador BILDT at the Court of St James, the Consul General AM?EN in Barcelona, and the Consul General CHRISTOPHERSEN in Antwerp.

The Swedish members of the Committee indicate, incidentally, that they do not consider it to be altogether desirable.

N:o 3.

The Swedish members were, the Premier, BOSTR?M, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. LAGERHEIM, and State Secretary HUSBERG. The Norwegian members were, Prime Ministers BLEHR and QVAM, and State Secretaries KNUDSEN and IBSEN

N:o 3 These latter decisions in the Communiqu?, which are conclusive in explaining the later standpoint taken by the Swedish government, are, of course, omitted by NANSEN.

The same difference also occurs in the drafts of laws which have been proposed at more recent dates.

It is manifest that it is on the part of Sweden that the idea of identical laws has arisen. In Norway they afterwards complained, especially the Radicals, of that >>Massive instrument.>>

In the debate in the Storthing on April 27:th 1904 Mr CARL BERNER said he had heard that Mr BLEHR'S explanation in the Storthing respecting; the Communiqu? before its publication was made known to the Swedish government: that the latter, neither previously, nor later on, had made any objections to it. To this State Secretary MICHELSEN sharply replied, that >>Mr BLEHR'S explanation was only the explanation of the Norwegian government on the subject of the Communiqu?.>>

Further affirmation is given by Mr IBSEN'S declaration in the Storthing, that the negotiations fell through in consequence of Mr BOSTR?M'S opposition to the request of the Norwegian delegates that in the Communiqu? it should be mentioned that the identical laws were to be valid only >>so long as the present system of foreign administration existed.>> When, finally, the Norwegians consented to omit this condition, it could only have been their intention that the laws should only be valid until by mutual consent they were rescinded. Other explanations in the Storthing of the divergencies of opinions on this point are to all intents unacceptable.

Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was supposed to characterise the Communiqu?, its general contents roused no unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate, serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless referred to the resolution of 1893.

Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs. Meanwhile after the publication of the Communiqu?, the Norwegian Radicals immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme.

However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards negotiating, and even BJ?RNSON, among others, warmly advocated the cause of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical Minister BLEHR, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable, impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old Radical government. Mr BLEHR resigned in the autumn 1903, after the elections. Professor HAGERUP, the leader of the Conservatives, then became Prime Minister at Christiania in companionship with D:r IBSEN as Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the leadership, but exercised, by its criticising, suspicious attitude, a powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in no favourable direction.

In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the basis of the Communiqu?. They were carried on slowly during the Spring 1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the proceedings was made by Mr. HAGERUP presenting to the Swedish government the Norwegian gouvernment proposal for identical laws.

It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development, from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration within the Union.

The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained intact.

But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most remarkable way. In the Consular Committee's deliberations, Norwegian opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an >>anomaly>>, in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled.

The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the Swedish governement could not entirely be ignored. According to this proposal the Consular administration in Christiania should regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.

Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter, under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul. Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.

This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a deficiency so much the more serious as the Act ? 1--c allowed the Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.

From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet cil would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno, till the autumn.

During the autumn Mr LAGERHEIM resigned on the grounds of difference of opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In November His Excellency Mr BOSTR?M went to Christiania and presented his conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if the Norwegian government would approve of them. These conditions stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers, the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King, recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases, should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office.

After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr HAGERUP made a written statement of his objections.

In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance, though the Norwegian majority itself, in the last Union Committee, emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the Diplomatic administration, Mr HAGERUP does not make the slightest acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy the deficiences. On the contrary, Mr HAGERUP mentions that such decisions would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to international and common law principles, and declared that from a national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the present arrangement of the Consular Service. In this, he forgets that Mr BOSTR?M'S conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not touch the Norwegian Consul's normal position as being a Norwegian civil Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr BOSTR?M, would very seldom occur.

It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr BOSTR?M'S demand, that the King, on the Swedish Minister's representations, should be empowered to dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway's Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr HAGERUP went to Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers, as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal for identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.

The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the Minister could not give orders directly to the Consular Office. Further, the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions, suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors, though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union. On the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs of that State.

What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently perfectly fair and moderate demands?

It declares that it >>stands to reason>> that the Norwegian Consular Office would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office. If the Swedish proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more important points the unsuitability of a >>hierarchal>> relation between Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the Norwegian government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of the legislative binding nature intended by the Communiqu?. Finally the Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions unacceptable, and adds, that >>if they should be adhered to further discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless>>. Really a formal ultimatum!

Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government's Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the liberal party's side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try, if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 1905. Its tone is one af decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend operations into departments that had previously been considered as belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian Cabinet, to the Consular Committee's resolution that the Norwegian Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was met by the Norwegian Cabinet's own admissions, that the Minister for Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls instructions, and, herewith the claim that, in the Diplomatic branch of affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the guarantees presupposed by the Communiqu? that the Consuls shall not exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on Norway's side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of that kind was not intended in the Communiqu?, as it had nothing to do with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian Consular Office.

On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions of the Communiqu?. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions, but their essential items must >>be adhered to>>. The Cabinet does not consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.

To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the reply, >>that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further communication on the matter.>>

FOOTNOTES:

Thus, their claim for a separate Consular service was worded in the Norwegian Moderate party's programme as follows: >>Our own Norwegian Consular Service with the exception of all matters connected with the relations between the Consular Service and Diplomatic administration is hereby declared established>>.

N:o 4.

N:o 5.

Some other points in Mr BOSTR?M'S Memorandum were rejected by the Norwegian side. They ran as follows:

N:o 6.

N:o 7.

They are mentioned, for instance, in the Act of Union.

It is characteristic that NANSEN in his review of the negotiations does not mention one of the Swedish demands. It can, however, be safely referred to all, who are impartial on the subject, as to whether its decisions, as NANSEN insists, imply the subordination of the Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs on a very extensive scale.

In that case, what numbers of legislative rules and regulations would have remained unwritten!

N:o 8.

N:o 9

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