Read Ebook: The First Seven Divisions Being a Detailed Account of the Fighting from Mons to Ypres by Hamilton Ernest Lord

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n they were further north, the original idea of the wheeling movement having been, in fact, entirely based on the knowledge of the gradually diminishing strength of the German forces as they stretched northwards.

It was a miserable day, foggy and wet. The Dorsets were on the extreme right of our army, in a line of trenches on the low ground between Givenchy and the canal. The attack was pressed with great vigour by the enemy, and the 1st Bedfords, on the left of the Dorsets, were driven out of the village of Givenchy. The left flank of the Dorsets was now exposed to enfilading fire from the ridge on which Givenchy stands, and their position was distinctly precarious. Some of the left-hand trenches were all but surrounded, the enemy having pressed forward into the gap at Givenchy, and from thence bearing down on the flank of the Dorsets. That regiment, however, held on with the utmost tenacity and successfully defended its position against repeated and most determined attacks; but the position was distinctly critical, and it was felt to be essential that orders of some sort should be received from Brigade Head Quarters. The telephonic communication had unfortunately been cut and there was no means of getting a message through except by hand, which, in the circumstances, seemed an all but impossible undertaking. A private of the name of Coombs, however, volunteered to try, and on the outward voyage actually got through untouched, but on returning with the necessary orders he was shot clean through the chest, but continued running for another 200 yards till he had delivered his message.

The loss, however, was limited--as a loss--to the treacherous massacre of several hundred gallant men, and the capture of two of the supporting guns. The Gunners, as usual, behaved with the utmost gallantry, but they too came under the same enfilading fire as the Dorsets and every man of the detachment except Captain Boscawen fell either killed or wounded. Two of the guns were captured, but, with this, the material advantage gained by the enemy began and ended, for the 1st Cheshires were brought up from reserve and, with their co-operation, the morning's line was re-occupied. The Cheshires, however, themselves suffered considerably, among their casualties being their C.O., Col. Vandeleur, who was killed while leading the attack.

On the 15th, as though in fury at the loss of their gallant General, the 3rd Division, now under the command of General Mackenzie, fought with a dash and determination which were irresistible. Their advance was continually checked by the country dykes, but, in spite of these hampering obstacles, the Germans were everywhere driven back with heavy loss. The 4th Middlesex and the 2nd R. Scots again did particularly good work, and, further north, in the 9th Brigade, the R. Fusiliers and the Northumberland Fusiliers gained high praise from the A.C. Commander for the vigour and activity with which they pushed forward in the face of strong opposition.

Conneau's cavalry, filling the eight-mile gap between the two Army Corps, also made good progress, as did the 3rd A.C., on the left. In the case of the latter Army Corps the 6th Division succeeded in reaching Sailly without encountering serious opposition, while the 4th Division got as far as Nieppe. The 2nd A.C., in its attempt to wheel, had so far advanced its left flank three miles in the last four days at a cost of 90 officers and 2,000 men. It had, however, inflicted very heavy losses on the enemy.

On the 16th the 3rd Division continued the wheeling movement with little opposition till it reached the village of Aubers, which was found to be strongly held, and where it was brought up short.

So much for the present as regards the general movement forward of the four divisions of infantry working south of Le Gheir. The attempt to drive the enemy back was destined to prove abortive, but this was not generally recognized by October 17th, and the idea was still to push our troops forward. This general desire to advance soon communicated itself to the 15th Brigade, on the extreme right of the British line at Givenchy, which had so far been looked upon as the pivot on which the left was to sweep round, and on the morning of the 17th the brigade was ordered to push ahead. During the night of the 16th the 1st Devons had taken over the trenches just north of the canal in which the Dorsets had suffered such terrible casualties three days earlier. The 1st Bedfords were on their left, and on their right, of course, were the French Territorials south of the canal.

At 5 a.m. on the morning of the 17th a great bombardment was concentrated upon Givenchy, and the Germans were soon shelled out of that place, which had been in their possession since the 13th. A general advance was thereupon ordered.

As a precaution against the calamity which had overtaken the Dorsets, the Devons put one company on the south side of the canal. This company was in touch with the French Territorials--so long as these latter kept up in line, which, as it proved, was not for long. The advance was made under considerable difficulties, as the country afforded no natural cover, and the enemy was found to be in far greater force than had been anticipated. However, in spite of a most continued and stubborn resistance, the Devons, in obedience to orders, succeeded in advancing their position 1,000 yards, and held on there till dusk, waiting for the French Territorials on their right and the regiment on their left to come up into line. These, however, failed to arrive, and it soon became clear that for the Devons to remain isolated at the point to which they penetrated could only result in the capture of the entire battalion. Their retirement, however, in the circumstances, was a matter of extreme difficulty, the country being quite flat and entirely destitute of cover. The enemy were favoured by an exceptionally clear field for their fire, and all their attention was naturally focussed on the one battalion which had dared to push so far ahead. The men were sheltering as best they could in ditches and behind haystacks, of which there was fortunately a fair sprinkling. When the order came to retire some crept away under shelter of the hedges; others had not even this cover, and had to take their chance in the open.

One detachment of some forty men were sheltering behind a large haystack in the open. They were quickly located, and shrapnel and machine-gun fire was concentrated on the haystack, which soon began to dwindle under the hail of missiles. Lieut. Worrall, who was one of the party, thereupon set fire to the haystack, and told the men to make a bolt for it singly, under cover of the smoke. This they successfully did, and with few further casualties--all but Sergt. Harris and another man, who were wounded and could not move. The haystack was now beginning to blaze fiercely and it was clear the men could not be left. Lieut. Worrall picked up Sergt. Harris and carried him 400 yards across the open to the shelter of the canal bank, where he left him. Then he went back for the other man.

In the meanwhile the line further north was still making a certain progress. At Lorgies a party of the K.O.S.B. Cyclists, under Corpl. Wheeler, rode right into the enemy outposts. They promptly dismounted, and, opening fire, held the enemy for half an hour till the brigade arrived on the scene and captured the place. Still further north again Gen. Shaw and his 9th Brigade was as usual fairly active. About 4 p.m. the R. Scots Fusiliers and the Northumberland Fusiliers attacked and carried the village of Aubers with the bayonet, completely routing the occupying troops; and a little later the R. Fusiliers and Lincolns performed the same office by the village of Herlies.

Aubers stands on the crest of the ridge which faces Neuve Chapelle. Herlies, on the other hand, lies at the foot of a long, gradual slope of open, cultivated land. The village was defended on the west side by a semi-circular line of trenches, protected by barbed wire entanglements. The defenders had also a Horse Artillery Battery and--as usual--a great number of machine-guns posted here and there in any suitable buildings. The two attacking battalions, on the other hand, were supported by a R.F.A. battery and a section of howitzers. These did admirable preliminary work, and at dusk the two regiments--Lincolns on right, R. Fusiliers on left--charged the trenches, carried them hot-handed and pursued the Germans into the village. Here further pursuit was unfortunately checked by the too great activity of our own artillery, but the position won was occupied and held for six days. The Lincolns, who were the chief sufferers, lost seventy-five men and two officers during this attack.

Further north, Conneau's cavalry added their share to the day's work by capturing Fromelles, so that there was an appreciable advance all round, which would have been greater still had not the 7th Brigade, which was on the right of the 3rd Division, failed to take the village of Illies.

The position then at night on the 17th was that the pivot point remained on the canal, south of Givenchy. From that point the line of the 2nd A.C. curved round behind La Bass?e and through Violaines, after which it zig-zagged towards the north-east in an irregular salient, the 3rd A.C. being thrown back on its left.

At dusk the undefeated 9th Brigade stormed and took the trenches one mile north-east of Illies, but as they were unsupported on either flank, they had to abandon the position and fall back. The 1st R. Scots Fusiliers did particularly good work on this occasion, and suffered correspondingly, Captain Burt and Lieuts. Cozens-Brooke, the Hon. J. Doyle, and Fergusson-Barton being killed, and six other officers wounded. In the meanwhile Conneau had advanced from Fromelles and attacked Fournes, but this attack failed.

Meanwhile, in the Armenti?res district, the 3rd A.C. was making great efforts to play up to its allotted part in the wheel to the south, the 4th Division being north of Armenti?res, the 6th Division south of it. The centre of interest was still to the south of Armenti?res, the concentration of German troops north of that town being still only in process of development. For the moment, then, we can neglect affairs further north, and follow the attempted wheeling movement of the troops south of Armenti?res to its furthest point east.

On the afternoon of the 18th the 16th Brigade captured Radinghem, the two battalions chiefly concerned being the 2nd Lancs. and Yorks. and the 1st Buffs. These two battalions, who were on the right of the 6th Division, gallantly stormed and carried the village and then--in the impetuosity of success and enterprise--followed on beyond after the retreating Germans. Here, in pushing forward through an impenetrable wood, they suddenly found themselves swept from all sides by concealed machine-guns, which literally rained bullets on them. The casualties here were very high, the Lancs. and Yorks. alone losing 11 officers and 400 men. Col. Cobbold and Major Bailey, however, who displayed the greatest coolness and courage throughout, succeeded in withdrawing the remains of the battalion in good order and getting it back to Radinghem.

The two battalions, in spite of their heavy losses, retained possession of this village throughout the night, though--had the Germans counter-attacked in force--things might have gone badly with them, as they were two miles ahead of the rest of the division.

FROM ATTACK TO DEFENCE

The 2nd A.C. front, owing to the irregularity of the advance, was of a zig-zag character, and on the night of the 19th Sir Horace ordered a slight retirement so as to straighten out the line. It was quickly evidenced that this step was not taken a moment too soon, for on the following day the Germans, confident in the sufficiency of their numbers, attacked all along the line, and succeeded in re-capturing Le Pilly, and with it the whole of the R. Irish Regiment. This was something of a disaster, but luckily the attack was not equally successful elsewhere. The 1st Cheshires, though attacked with great vigour, held their ground unshaken throughout this day and the next, and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. Two platoons of the R. Fusiliers, who were sent up to establish communication between Herlies and the R. Irish Regiment at Le Pilly, were caught in flank, owing to the capture of the latter place, and suffered severely, Captain Carey, in command, being killed.

The 9th Brigade, which had throughout these operations been on the left of the 3rd Division, was now temporarily transferred to the 3rd A.C., whose line, reaching as it did from Radinghem to Le Gheir, was considered by the C. in C. to be too thin for safety. The removal of this brigade had the effect of widening the gap between the 2nd and 3rd A.C.'s by a further four or five miles, and the responsibilities of Conneau's cavalry were correspondingly increased, the left of the 2nd A.C. now stopping short at Riez, which was held by the 1st Gordons. The weakening of the 2nd A.C. by the borrowing of one of its brigades and the capture of one of its battalions was made up to it in some measure by the arrival of the Lahore Division of Indians, under General Watkis, which took up a position in rear of it at Neuve Chapelle.

With the additional assistance which had been lent him, Gen. Pulteney was everywhere successful in holding his ground. At one moment in the day the enemy succeeded in getting possession of Le Gheir, but as the loss of this place would have laid bare the flank of the cavalry at St. Yves, Gen. Hunter-Weston decided that it must be retaken at any cost, and the work was entrusted to the K.O. Regiment and the Lancs. Fusiliers. These two battalions, finely handled by Col. Butler, of the Lancs. Fusiliers, proved themselves quite equal to the call made upon them, and not only re-captured the lost trenches, but took 200 prisoners and released 40 of our own men who had been captured.

THE BIRTH OF THE YPRES SALIENT

The main idea on the extreme left of our line, at the moment, was to seize the bridge over the River Lys at Menin, and so impede the further advance of the German reinforcements which were being steadily railed up from the direction of Lille. In the event it turned out that the manoeuvre was impracticable owing to the insufficiency in numbers of the British force operating east of Ypres. This force, it will be understood, consisted, at the time, of the 7th Division alone, supported by two cavalry brigades on its left flank, whereas the Germans had by the 19th concentrated on the spot a force of five or six times this magnitude. However, in the intention lies the explanation of the subsequent Ypres salient. The original idea was strategically sound, but it was frustrated owing to the difficulty and consequent delay in concentration which accompanied the transfer of the British force from the Aisne to its new field of operation in Flanders. It was a race as to which army could concentrate with the greatest rapidity, and the Germans--having by far the easier task and by far the shorter road to travel--got in first.

At 5 a.m., then, on the 19th, the 22nd Brigade set out from Zonnebeke on its forward movement, the 2nd Queen's on the left, the 1st R. Welsh Fusiliers in the centre, and the 2nd Warwicks on the right, the 1st S. Staffords being in reserve.

In this engagement Captain Kingston, Captain Lloyd, Captain Brennan and Lieut. Chance were killed, and Major Gabbett, Captain St. John, Captain Skaife and Lieuts. Jones and Naylor were wounded.

Throughout that night a constant stream of refugees passed through Zonnebeke on their way westward from Roulers, which was burning. These were all subjected to examination, but their number was too great to make close examination possible, and that many spies got through among them is unquestionable.

It very soon became apparent that the newly-arrived German troops had no intention of letting the grass grow under their feet. During the night they had put behind them the six miles which separate Ledeghem from Zonnebeke, and at eleven o'clock on the morning of the 20th they started bombarding the latter place. Once more fate elected that the R. Welsh Fusiliers should stand in the path of the attack. They were now on the left of the 22nd Brigade, and they were attacked not only from the direction of the road, but from their left flank, which was very much exposed, the line of the cavalrymen north of the road being even more extended than that of the 7th Division. However, in spite of everything, they held their ground with great determination throughout this day and the next. Their losses, however, were again very severe indeed. This was, in fact, the first of the 7th Division battalions to undergo that gradual process of annihilation which was destined in time to be the fate of all. The extreme tension of the situation at Zonnebeke was in some part relieved by the arrival on the scene, during the night, of the 4th Brigade, who took over the ground north of the Zonnebeke road from the cavalry. This brigade formed part of the 1st A.C. which had arrived at St. Omer from the Aisne on the 17th and 18th, and had been billeted outside Ypres on the night of the 19th.

The question as to how best to dispose of this 1st A.C. was an extremely delicate one. The numerical weakness of the Cavalry Corps, holding the Wytschate and Messines line, suggested strongly that it would be of the greatest use in that area. On the other hand was the very grave danger of the Allies' left flank being turned by the sudden advance of fresh German forces north and east of Ypres, of sufficient strength to break through the very thin line guarding that quarter. In this dilemma, the C. in C., with consummate judgment, decided to send Sir Douglas Haig's Army Corps to the northern side of Ypres. The wisdom of this step became apparent on the very next day, that is on the day when the 22nd Brigade advanced to the Roulers-Menin road, and were forced back by the unexpected appearance of two Army Corps whose presence was unknown to our air-scouts. These fresh German forces as we have seen, pursued the 22nd Brigade as far as Zonnebeke, and there attacked our line with the utmost determination on the 20th and 21st. On the first of these two days, the brigade, as already described, managed to hold its own--though at great sacrifice--but the German attacking force was all the time being augmented, while our defensive force, owing to continuous losses, was getting weaker; and it is hardly conceivable that the enemy's advance could have been checked for another twenty-four hours, except for the timely arrival of the 1st A.C.

In the meanwhile the Guards' Brigade, north of the road, had not been idle, and it is not too much to say that, except for the arrival of this brigade in the very nick of time, the position would have been very nearly desperate. As it was, however, their presence at once made itself felt. The fire of the S. Staffords from the right, the Guards' Brigade from the left, and the 2nd Queen's from in face, was more than the German advance was prepared at the moment to push forward against, and it came to a standstill. The Guards' casualties were considerable, especially in the case of the 3rd Coldstream, who had the Hon. C. Monck and Lieut. Waller killed, and Colonel Feilding, Lieut. Darrell and Lieut. Leese wounded. Lord Feilding was given the D.S.O. for conspicuous gallantry on this occasion. The 52nd Oxford Light Infantry, acting with the Guards' Brigade, proved in every way worthy of the association, and fully lived up to its great fighting reputation. Amongst those who particularly distinguished themselves in this regiment during the fight were Lieut. Spencer, Corpl. Hodges and Pte. Hastings.

On the evening of October 21st the position was that the 21st Brigade at Becelaere and the 20th at Kruiseik and Zandvoorde were still very considerably ahead of the 22nd, which, as we have seen, had been driven back to Zonnebeke. North of Zonnebeke the line of the 1st Division fell still further back, facing, in fact, very nearly due north, while south of Zandvoorde there was no line at all, the 7th Division here ending in space, for reasons already given. Later on the 3rd Cavalry Division--when released from its duties north of Zonnebeke--were detailed for the duty of keeping up the communication between Zandvoorde and the Cavalry Corps far back at Hollebeke, Wytschate and Messines, but even so, the line they occupied fell back almost at right angles from our true front, and was a constant source of anxiety. For a General voluntarily to relinquish ground already won is probably the supreme act of renunciation, at the same time it is obvious that three sides of a square are longer than the fourth side, and therefore require more men for their defence, and it is no exaggeration to say that between October 20th and 26th the Ypres salient bore a perilous resemblance to three sides of a square.

The timely arrival of the 1st A.C. had undoubtedly saved the situation for the moment, as far as the German attempt to break through at Zonnebeke was concerned, but the position was still one for the very gravest anxiety. Even with the addition of the 1st A.C. we had only three infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades with which to defend the entire front from Bixschoote, due north of Ypres, to Hollebeke, nearly due south of it. From Bixschoote to Hollebeke, as the crow flies, is a matter of some eight miles, but, as our front at that time jutted out as far as Becelaere, six miles east of Ypres, it may be reckoned that the frontage to be defended was not less than sixteen miles in length. The strength of the enemy--that is to say, of the force which was immediately pressing forward at this moment on the Ypres frontage--may be approximately reckoned at 100,000; and had the German General at this juncture pushed his forces along all the main avenues to Ypres, it is difficult to see how he could have been held back. The line of defence was ridiculously extended--extended indeed far beyond the recognized limits of effective resistance, and there were no reserves available with which to strengthen any threatened spot. Every fighting man was in the long, thin line that swept round in that uncomfortable curve from Bixschoote to Hollebeke. The 89th French Territorial Division was, it is true, in general reserve, at Poperinghe, but this division was composed entirely of untried troops who could in no sense claim to be comparable to the French regulars. The 87th French Territorial Division, again, had as much as it could do to attend to its own affairs north of Ypres, and was not to be counted on as a source of reinforcement.

From this time on, the whole of our line north of the Zonnebeke road was gradually taken over by the 1st A.C., the 6th and 7th C.B., who had so far been responsible for that section of the front, being thereby released and retiring to Hooge, from which point, for the time being, they acted as a kind of mobile reserve--the fan-like arrangement of roads which branches out eastward from Ypres enabling them to be sent with the least possible delay to any threatened point on the front.

For purposes of descriptive clearness, it may perhaps be pardonable, even at the risk of labouring the point a little, to call attention once more to the fact that the British force in Flanders now consisted of two distinct and separate armies, which we may call the North and South Army. The South Army was made up of the 2nd A.C., the 3rd A.C., and the 19th Brigade, and was supported by Conneau's cavalry, which operated between these two Army Corps, and by the Lahore Indians in rear. The line of this army extended as far north as Le Gheir, or, rather, let us say, Ploegsteert, to which place the left of the 3rd A.C. shortly withdrew.

The North Army consisted of the 1st A.C. and the 7th Division, supported by the 3rd Cavalry Division, and the southernmost point in its charge at the moment was Hollebeke, or, to be more precise, the canal which turns off sharply towards Ypres just north of Hollebeke. The eight miles gap between the North Army and the South Army was held by the Cavalry Corps under Allenby.

The terrific fighting, then, of the end of October and beginning of November may be considered as taking place in three distinct sections, viz.--the South Army, the Cavalry Corps, and the North Army. The latter, it may be added, had the 89th French Territorial Division in support, and Gen. Bidon, with the 87th French Territorial Division, on its left, north of Ypres.

The fact that the 1st A.C. had arrived on the scene absolutely at the psychological moment in order to avert disaster, was made abundantly clear, not only by the effective support which the 2nd Division of that Army Corps was able to lend north of the Zonnebeke road on the 21st, but also by the immediate demand which arose further south for the services of the released 3rd Cavalry Division. These two Cavalry Brigades, it will be remembered, had been replaced on the night of the 20th by the 2nd Division, who had taken over their position north of the Zonnebeke road.

At 1 p.m. on the following day, that is, at the same time that the Welsh Fusiliers were being so fiercely attacked along the Zonnebeke road, news arrived that Gough's 2nd Cavalry Division was being very hard pressed, and had been forced to fall back on Messines. This left a gap, or--to be more accurate--widened the gap on the right of the 7th Division at Zandvoorde, and the 6th C.B. were sent off to fill it, as well as might be, by occupying the two canal crossings north of Hollebeke. This they did with success, and the 10th Hussars and 4th Hussars even attacked the Ch?teau de Hollebeke itself, but were unable to take it, on account of its being still under fire from our own artillery. Later on in the evening, however, it was felt that the line south-west of Zandvoorde was dangerously open, and the 6th C.B. was shifted in that direction, the 10th Hussars at 3 o'clock in the morning taking over the Zandvoorde trenches from the 2nd Scots Guards in the 20th Brigade. The 7th C.B. went into reserve at St. Eloi, where it remained for the night. In the meanwhile the C. in C. had sent up the 7th Indian Brigade to help support Gough.

This transfer of the Zandvoorde trenches into the keeping of the 3rd Cavalry Division was the first abridgement of the immense frontage held by the 7th Division. From this time on, till the moment when they were permanently abandoned, it will be found that these Zandvoorde trenches were in the occupation either of the 6th C.B. or the 7th C.B. They formed the most dangerous position in the whole line of defence, being in the form of a promontory which jutted out defiantly into the enemy's country. The 3rd Cavalry Division suffered very severely during its nine days' defence of these deadly trenches, the 10th Hussars, who were perhaps the worst sufferers, losing on the very first day of occupation Col. Barnes, Major Mitford and Captain Stewart.

THE STAND OF THE FIFTH DIVISION

In the meanwhile, further south, at and around Givenchy, a situation was developing which in point of dramatic interest, and as a test of indomitable resolution, bid fair to rival the defence of Ypres. From Givenchy to Le Gheir the 2nd and 3rd A.C. had now definitely assumed the defensive, and the story of how that defence was maintained in the face of overwhelming odds, and under conditions of extreme difficulty and fatigue, is one of which Britain may ever be justly proud.

The 21st French Army was, throughout these La Bass?e operations, responsible for the ground up to the canal south of Givenchy. From that point the 5th Division took up the line; then came the 3rd Division, then the 6th, and finally, with its left resting on Le Gheir, the 4th Division. Behind the 5th and 3rd Divisions were the Indians.

Between Le Gheir and Zandvoorde, which we may take as the southernmost point of the arm of Ypres, was Allenby's Cavalry Corps.

In the case of the South Army, as with the Army of Ypres, the impetus of the first advance had carried our troops to a line which was only afterwards maintained under great strain, in the face of the masses of troops which the enemy were gradually concentrating in this particular area. La Bass?e and Ypres became, for the time being, the two points on which German attention was specially riveted. With the avowed intention of breaking through to Calais by one or other of these routes, troops were being systematically railed up from the east and massed along the Belgian frontier. It was officially computed that by October 20th there were 250,000 German troops north of La Bass?e, and that by the middle of November that number had been increased to 750,000.

The fact that it was the British Army which stood between this vast mass of armed men and its projected advance was in all probability not entirely a matter of chance. If the attempt to break through either at Ypres or La Bass?e had succeeded, the little British force would either have been wiped out, or hopelessly disgraced in the eyes of its allies. In either case the prestige of England would have received a rude shock; and, with a German base established at Calais, she would have been in imminent danger of losing something more than prestige.

The fact, then, that the Kaiser's selected road to Calais or Paris, as the case might be, lay through the thirty miles of front held by the British troops, was in all probability part of a carefully-thought-out plan. One factor in the case, however, had been overlooked, or at least under-rated, viz.--the indomitable tenacity of the British soldier in the face of difficulties. Of this essentially British quality the Germans had as yet had no practical experience. At Mons and Le Cateau we had dropped back before their onslaughts--dropped back, it is true, in obedience to orders, and in conformity with a pre-arranged plan. Still, we had dropped back. At the Aisne there had been no serious attempt on the part of the enemy to break through our lines. Such had not been part of the German programme at the moment. It was therefore not wholly unnatural, that the very thin British line between Givenchy and Ypres, should have been reckoned at German Head Quarters as being penetrable at any point where sufficient pressure was brought to bear.

In the face of beliefs such as these, the stone-wall resistance put up by our three war-worn Army Corps must have been a source of equal astonishment and exasperation to the wire-pullers in Berlin. To the Britisher it must always bring a thrill of justifiable pride. Many of the regiments engaged were technically "annihilated." Their officers went; their senior N.C.O.'s went; they were worn to the last stage of mental and physical exhaustion by sleeplessness, and by unceasing digging and fighting. And still they held on. There were no "hands uppers" among these men from Britain. We gave ground, of course, both in the La Bass?e area and at Ypres. In the latter case a withdrawal of some kind was dictated by every consideration of military prudence. The original bulge was a danger from every point of view, and with no compensating advantage. It thinned our line and laid us open at all times to the risk of enfilading attacks from north and south.

At La Bass?e, too, we had got too far ahead, and from the military point of view we lost nothing by falling back a few miles. But from the three points in the line of vital strategical importance, Givenchy, Ploegsteert and Klein Zillebeke, we were never driven. Those points were held on to with a stubborn determination which nothing could break through; and to the battalions on whose shoulders fell the main weight of this burden is due the homage of all who stayed at home. It is not suggested that there was an entirely uniform standard of excellence throughout all the units engaged. Any attempt to make such a representation would be a gross injustice to those battalions which stand out, and which have for ever immortalized themselves, and the honour of British arms, by an indomitable resistance which can find few parallels in the history of war.

But at first we got too far ahead at La Bass?e as at Ypres, and this soon became very clear. During a thick fog on the morning of the 21st, some of the 5th Division were driven out of their trenches; and in lieu of making any attempt to retake the trenches so lost, Gen. Morland--who on Sir Charles Fergusson's promotion had taken over command of the division--thought it advisable to readjust the entire line.

Further north, just east of Fromelles, the 19th Brigade had also to give ground. They fought all through this day with great gallantry, but their losses were very heavy, and, in spite of all efforts, by evening they had been forced back over a mile. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were specially conspicuous on this occasion; they fought with indomitable valour, and it was only with the greatest reluctance that in the end they obeyed the order to abandon their trenches. In Sergt. Ross's platoon eighty per cent. had been killed or wounded, but the gallant sergeant still refused to give way.

In the meanwhile the Devons had been forced to fall back some two miles from Canteleux, which they had now occupied for three days, to Givenchy, the former place having been formed into an untenable salient by the withdrawal of the troops on either flank.

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