Read Ebook: Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society Volume 01 (of 14) 1898 by Mississippi Historical Society Riley Franklin L Franklin Lafayette Editor Rowland Dunbar Editor

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he circuit and supreme courts. The registrar shall obey the orders of the commissioners in directing a person to be registered, or a name to be stricken from the registration books.

Having now considered and presented the evolution of suffrage in this state and given by way of recital and incidentally at least, its present status, we come to consider the objects upon which the suffrage may be exercised, and this can be easily stated by the general averment that all legislative and executive officers are elected by the suffragists; the executive officers of the state are not elected necessarily by a plurality or a majority vote. We have a sort of an electoral scheme, which is created by the constitution in the following words:

Section 141. If no person shall receive such majorities, then the house of representatives shall proceed to choose a governor from the two persons who shall have received the highest number of popular votes. The election shall be by viva voce, which shall be recorded in the journal, in such manner as to show for whom each member voted.

Section 142. In case of an election of governor or any state officer by the house of representatives, no member of that house shall be eligible to receive any appointment from the governor or other state officer so elected during the term for which he shall be elected.

Section 143. All other state officers shall be elected at the same time and in the same manner as provided for election of governor.

The legislature is prohibited from electing officers to a very great extent by the following section of the constitution:

Section 99. The legislature shall not elect any other than its own officers, state librarian and United States Senators; but this section shall not prohibit the legislature from appointing presidential electors.

All the judges of the state, except justices of the peace, are appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate. Mississippi was, it may be mentioned parenthetically, the first state to provide for an elective judiciary; this was done in her constitution of 1832; but she is now as far away from that mode of selection as she can well be, her present constitution providing for their appointment and her people generally, it is believed, are thoroughly satisfied with the present status of the matter. There are two instances in which the electors vote directly upon the subject of the enforcement of laws; and without an affirmative vote in their favor the statutes are not enforced. These are, first the Local Option law, by which the qualified electors of a county, if a majority vote against the sale, may prohibit the licensing of dram-shops in the county, and under which a large majority of the counties of the state have secured absolute statutory prohibition of the liquor traffic; and, second, the fence and stock law, by which is determined the question of whether the owners of live stock shall keep them confined, and thus allow of the production of crops on unenclosed lands. This resolves itself into a question of "fences" or "no fences," and it is left to a vote in the counties, or parts of counties can vote upon it. This question is left to "the resident freeholders and leaseholders for a term of three years or more" of the territory so voting. It will be noticed that neither sex nor age is mentioned, and in truth women and infants do actually vote in the state, on this interesting and to those involved, most serious question.

The Supreme Court of the state has settled beyond cavil that the statute is constitutional and valid. This "fence" or "no fence" election is possibly an exception to the general rule of the state that a plurality vote elects or carries. I say, possibly is an exception, because of ambiguity in the statute, construed as I think it may be seen by some minds, it will require two thirds of the vote cast to put the "no fence" law in force.

All elections in Mississippi since 1821 have been by ballot, and this is now the constitutional rule; we have here the Australian or secret ballot system very much as it is found in a number of states of the Union, and it accomplishes in its practical operation the primary objects of the system; first, the absolute prevention of bribery, for no man will bribe a voter if the only evidence of the delivery of the contracted-for vote be the word of the bribe taker, and, second, the prevention of intimidation of voters, which is practically impossible.

The absence from the voting place since the introduction of the system of the ticket broker and professional bummer is notable.

It was the intention of the writer when this article was begun to present his views on many of the questions suggested and germain to the general subject, but this paper has now grown so long that he will have to be content with a presentation of a mere historical narrative of matters pertaining to suffrage in this state. He consoles himself with the reflection that perhaps such a contribution may be more valuable to the true and earnest student of the subject than would be any discourse that he might write which in its nature was sought to be made philosophical, or which was merely speculative. If the facts are presented, if the history be made accessible, the student who is interested enough to read will draw the proper conclusions.

SPANISH POLICY IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER THE TREATY OF SAN LORENZO.

BY FRANKLIN L. RILEY, PH. D.

October 16, 1795, Thomas Pinckney, in behalf of the United States and the Prince of Peace, representing His Catholic Majesty, signed at San Lorenzo el Real, a treaty which contained among other things, the following stipulations:

"The southern boundary of the United States, which divides their territory from the Spanish colonies of East and West Florida, shall be designated by a line beginning on the River Mississippi at the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of latitude north of the equator, which from thence shall be drawn due east to the River Apalachicola," etc.

"If there should be any troops, garrisons or settlements of either party in the territory of the other according to the above-mentioned boundaries, they shall be withdrawn from the said territory within the term of six months after the ratification of this treaty, or sooner if possible."

"One Commissioner and one Surveyor shall be appointed by each of the contracting parties, who shall meet at the Natchez on the left side of the River Mississippi before the expiration of six months from the ratification of this convention and they shall proceed to run and mark this boundary according to the stipulations."

"The navigation of the said River, in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean shall be free only to his subjects and the citizens of the United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the subjects of other Powers by special convention."

These terms, so favorable to the United States and so destructive of Spanish interests, had long been the rock upon which all plans for an adjustment of the differences between the two powers had been stranded. Nor were they finally extorted from Spain until a concurrence of unfavorable events had precipitated a diplomatic crisis. Even then his Catholic Majesty seemed to consider such stipulations as only a temporary expedient, the fulfillment of which he hoped eventually to be able to evade. The Prince of Peace himself admits that political circumstances forced Spain to consent to the treaty and intimates further that he would have made even greater concessions if they had been demanded by the United States. In writing of these negotiations, he says:

"I had taken to heart the treaty , which unknown to us the English cabinet had negotiated with the United States of America; this treaty afforded great latitude to evil designs; it was possible to injure Spain in an indirect manner and without risk, in her distant possessions.

Subsequent events proved, however, that Godoy had overestimated the probabilities of a consolidation of interests between the United States and Great Britain, and that Spain had also failed to gain that ascendency over the affairs of this "nation of republicans," which she hoped to do through this treaty. She was therefore no longer interested in fulfilling its stipulations. These facts are substantiated by a letter which Stoddard claims was written by Governor Gayoso in June, 1796, to a confidential friend, and which came to light several years afterward. In this communication Gayoso claims that:

"The object of Great Britain in her treaty with the United States about this period, was to attach them to her interests, and even render them dependent on her, and, therefore, the Spanish treaty of limits was made to counterbalance it; but as Great Britain had totally failed in her object it was not the policy of Spain to regard her stipulations."

In order to evade the treaty, she now returned to a line of policy which she had adopted several years previous and which had also been tried by more than one foreign power since the combined efforts of England, France and Spain to "coop up" the United States between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic, at the close of the Revolutionary War. This was nothing less than a dismemberment of the United States. But the accomplishment of this bold project required time. She, therefore, resorted to her historic policy of procrastination, hoping ultimately to evade the treaty and thus regain what had been wrested from her in diplomacy. She was fully aware of the dissatisfaction the western states had expressed over the tardiness and at times the apparent indifference of the United States to the navigation of the Mississippi and she also realized that the publication of the treaty "would bring her project of dismemberment to a crisis and in a manner to compel the western people to make a decided election to adhere to the Atlantic states or to embrace the splendid advantages held out to them on the Mississippi." Hence, upon the announcement of the treaty in New Orleans, a Spanish emissary was immediately dispatched from that place to Tennessee and Kentucky, with authority to engage the services of the principal inhabitants in a scheme to disaffect the people towards the United States by the free use of money and promises of independence and free trade. In Gayoso's letter of June, 1796, referred to above, the assertion was made that,

"It was expected that several states would separate from the union, which would absolve Spain from her engagements; because, as her contract was made with the union, it would be no longer obligatory than while the union lasted. That Spain, contrary to her expectations, was not likely to derive any advantages from the treaty, and that her views and policy would be changed, particularly if an alteration took place in the political existence of the United States. He therefore concluded, that all things considered, nothing more would result from the treaty than the free navigation of the Mississippi."

A second line of policy for evading the treaty was then opened up. This was to postpone an execution of its stipulations awaiting the development of certain international complications which seemed to be inevitable. There had been a rupture in the diplomatic relation of the United States and France and hostilities between these two countries seemed to be near at hand. Mr. Pickering, who was Secretary of State from 1795 to 1800, considered this the real cause for delay on the part of Spain, after contending that the other reasons given by the Spanish authorities were "merely ostensible," he says:

In order to find time for the operation of these schemes, the Spanish officials produced, from time to time, such excuses as either the treaty or the circumstances rendered plausible. After months of fruitless delay, they determined to rest their final action upon the results of another effort to detach the western states from the Union. An emissary was again sent to Tennessee and Kentucky to confer with certain men who were former correspondents of the governors of Louisiana. He found, however, that the people were less disposed towards a change than they were ten years previous, especially since they were likely to secure the navigation of the Mississippi,--the real cause of their former disaffection--without resorting to a hazardous enterprise. After an eventful sojourn in this region, he returned to New Orleans in January, 1798, bearing the unwelcome report which convinced the Governor General that Spain had lost all hope of political prestige in the territory north of the 31st degree and east of the Mississippi. Arrangements were then perfected for the execution of the treaty.

In accordance with a stipulation of the treaty, President Washington appointed the Honorable Andrew Ellicott as Commissioner to run the boundary line in behalf of the United States. He left Philadelphia for Natchez by way of the Ohio and the Mississippi, September 16, 1796. But his descent of the Mississippi had been anticipated by the Spaniards, who had prepared obstructive measures in advance of his coming. So that whenever he came in contact with Spanish officials they evinced a disposition to hinder his descent of the river, if not prevent it altogether. Some of them affected ignorance of the treaty, others appeared embarrassed at the presence of the Americans, while none of them had made or were making, so far as the Commissioner could observe, any preparations to evacuate the posts according to the terms of the treaty.

Before reaching his destination, Ellicott received a communication from Governor Gayoso, expressing his gratification at the arrival of the Commissioner in those waters and requesting that the military escort accompanying him should be left at the mouth of the Bayou Pierre, sixty miles above Natchez, in order to prevent an "unforeseen misunderstanding" between the troops of the two nations. Since the treaty had provided for such an escort, this request was deemed improper by Ellicott. He yielded the point, however, for the time being, out of deference to the wishes of the Governor.

Upon his arrival at Natchez, February 24, 1797, ten months after the ratification of the treaty, he found no one ready to co-operate with him in the performance of the duty assigned. To the contrary, he learned through private sources that the Baron de Carondelet, the Governor General of Louisiana, had declared that the treaty was never intended to be carried into effect, that as Commissioner on the part of Spain, he would evade or delay from one pretense or another, the running of the boundary line until the treaty would become "a dead letter," and that Louisiana either had been, or would soon be ceded to France.

About this time a suggestive and characteristic event occurred which gives an insight into the temper of both the Spanish Governor and the American Commissioner. About two hours after the flag of the United States had been hoisted over the Commissioner's camp, Gayoso requested that it be lowered. This request met with a flat refusal, and though there were rumors of parties being formed to cut it down, "the flag wore out upon the staff." Gayoso explained, a fortnight later, that his objection to the flag was not prompted by a desire to show a discourtesy to the United States, but to prevent any unbecoming conduct on the part of the Indians. This explanation, however, seems to have been an after-thought. Suffice it to say, when it was offered the Indians had become so troublesome that Ellicott had determined to send for his escort. The Governor, after declaring that he would construe their descent as an insult to his master, and then suggesting that they might with propriety join the Commissioner at Loftus Cliffs, near Clarksville, finally consented that they go into camp at Bacon's Landing, a few miles below town. This put an end to the efforts of the Spaniards to draw Ellicott away from Natchez, the place designated by the treaty for the meeting of the commissioners.

This reason was first given in a proclamation issued by Governor Gayoso on the 28th of March, 1797, but bearing the Gate of the day following. It was reiterated in a second proclamation of the same date. Yet, when the Secretary of State, two and a half months later, received from Commissioner Ellicott a notice of this reason for delay, he declared that no such negotiation had existed and that it was the first time these objections to the evacuation of the posts had been heard of. Two months later still he observed that,

Orders were promptly issued, however, by the President and the Secretary of War to assure Governor Gayoso that no person would be "disturbed in his possession or property, till an opportunity had been afforded to apply to Congress," and that they might "rely upon their claims being adjusted upon the most equitable principles."

II, DESIRE OF FIRST ESTABLISHING FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INDIANS AND THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORY TO BE CEDED.

/# "Upon a view of the whole correspondence ... submitted to the President, it appears that there is but too much reason to believe ... that an undue influence has been exercised over the Indians by the officers of His Catholic Majesty to prepare them for a rupture with the United States, those suspicions corresponding with other intelligence recently received by the Secretary of War and by me."

Instructions were issued by the Secretary of War to assure the Spanish Commandant that effort would be made "to preserve a continuance of the pacific dispositions of the Indians within our limits, towards the subjects of His Catholic Majesty or his Indians; and to prevent their commencing hostilities against either."

The treaty failed to specify whether the posts should be surrendered with the buildings and fortifications intact, or whether they should first be dismantled. Gayoso declared that a treaty with the Indians required a demolition of the post at Walnut Hill and that orders had been issued to that effect, but that owing to their unsettled dispositions he had received counter orders to prevent the fortifications from being injured. General Wayne took the position that the posts should be left standing. President Adams, however, left the matter entirely to the discretion of the Spanish officials, and thus at once brought an end to the validity of this excuse. On this sub-Secretary Pickering maintained:

"It is probably the first time that to 'withdraw,' or retire from a place, has been imagined to intend its destruction. If, at the formation of the treaty, the demolition of the posts had been intended, it would assuredly have been expressed."

When the Spaniards had really decided to surrender the district, no further mention was made of this subject, showing that, notwithstanding their treaty with the Indians, they considered the demolition of the forts of no consequence whatever.

"If the posts of the Natchez and Walnut Hills 'are the only bulwarks of Lower Louisiana, to stop the course of the British,' as the Baron alerts and if, therefore, Spain is justifiable in holding them, she may retain them, without any limitation of time, for her security in any future war, as well as in that which now exists."

Before the appearance of the Baron's proclamation containing this reason for delay, the Spanish Minister had been informed that the Secretary of State saw no reasons for such suspicions and the British Minister had been notified that the Government of the United States would suffer neither British nor Spanish troops to march through its territory for the purpose of hostility of one against the other. The Spanish Minister replied, however, that he knew to a certainty that the English had made a proposition to General Clarke of Georgia in order to secure his influence in that State in a proposed attack against Florida. At the request of Mr. Pickering, this report was investigated by the District Attorney of Georgia. He replied that he could not find any one who knew of the matter or who entertained a belief of the report; and that from General Clark's known violent antipathies to the English and other circumstances, he doubted the truthfulness of it altogether.

When the attention of Mr. Liston, the British Minister, was directed to the subject, he pointedly denied that his government either had intended or was then intending to invade Louisiana. A few days later, however, he admitted that a plan for attacking the Floridas and other Spanish possessions adjoining the United States had been submitted to him by other persons, whom he declined to name, but stated it was discountenanced by him because its success depended upon a violation of the neutrality of the United States and an enlistment of the Indians. According to this plan, the expedition was to be undertaken by a British sea force, which would be joined by such volunteers of the United States as would join the king's standard when raised on Spanish soil.

The noted conspiracy of Senator Blount of Tennessee then came to light and precipitated a spirited discussion between the Spanish Minister and Mr. Pickering. The former contended that the plot had been revealed and that no one any longer doubted that the expedition was to have taken place, while the latter maintained that there could have been no connection between Blount's scheme and either the expedition from Canada, or the project attributed to General Clarke. The Secretary argued in support of his position that Blount's expedition was to have been formed in one of the states south of the River Ohio; that it was destined against the Floridas, and perhaps Lower Louisiana; that Blount himself expected to be at the head of it; that it was not to be undertaken but in conjunction with a British force; and that "on the proposal of the expedition to the British Government, it was totally rejected." He maintained further that the suspicion of a British invasion from Canada was groundless for the following reasons:-- Preparations for such an expedition would have attracted attention and rendered satisfactory proofs attainable; the troops of the United States, stationed along the Canadian border, were in position to protect the frontier, as well as to get information of any warlike preparations and communicate the same to the Secretary of War, yet no such communications had been made; the British did not have on the lakes a force adequate to such an enterprise; the routes suggested for such a campaign would have interposed great difficulties for the transportation of troops, equipage, provisions, etc., even if they could have been taken without violating the territory of the United States; and the British Minister, after inquiring of the Governor General of Canada and of "the British Secretary of State," denied that his Government either had intended or was then intending such an expedition.

Secretary Pickering regarded the expectation of a rupture between the United States and France as the real cause of the delay in running the boundary and in evacuating the posts. With reference to any hostile intentions on the part of the United States, he wrote,

"Never, perhaps, was conceived a more absurd idea, than that of marching troops from the Ohio to the State of Tennessee, and thence to the Natchez, in the whole a tedious, difficult and expensive route of many hundred miles, chiefly through a wilderness; when, if the United States had any hostile views, they had only to collect their troops to the Ohio, and suffer them to be floated down that river and the Mississippi, almost without labor, with great expedition, and at small expense, to the county to be attacked."

He had scarcely failed in these schemes, however, when he heard of the descent of Lieutenant Pope with a small detachment of American troops to take charge of the posts upon their evacuation. He then sent Ellicott an open letter directed to Pope, in which it was stated that "for sundry reasons it would be proper and conduce to the harmony of the two nations" for these troops to remain at a distance until the posts were evacuated, which would be completed in a few days. But instead of complying with the Governor's request to second this effort at harmony, Ellicott wrote to Pope that there was evidence to show that an evacuation was not really intended in any reasonable time and that in his opinion the sooner the American troops reached Natchez the better. Upon receiving the Governor's letter Pope stopped his detachment at the Walnut Hills. April 17, Ellicott wrote a second letter stating that a rupture with the Spanish authorities at Natchez was near at hand and that in his opinion the Lieutenant could better serve his country at Natchez than at any other point on the river. In response to this letter, Pope and his command resumed their descent, the Governor finally consenting, and reached Natchez April 24, 1797.

Such are the general outlines of the contest that was waged between the representatives of the two powers over the dilatory policy of Spain. Subsequent diplomatic discussion centered on the navigation of the Mississippi and the affairs at Natchez assumed the form of a popular outbreak against the established government in the district.

TIME AND PLACE RELATIONS IN HISTORY, WITH SOME LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI APPLICATIONS

PROF. H. E. CHAMBERS.

A student or writer of history, imbued with the true and scientific spirit of historical research and expression, would hesitate to accept the task of compiling the narrative of a State or country if it were required of him to confine himself strictly to local events. He would, indeed, find it difficult to isolate the facts bearing upon the State or country from their antecedents, distant in time and space, or from their consequents when communicated to contemporaneous and succeeding communities, or social organizations.

The great stream of human affairs is a tide of many currents. He who would pilot by his pen the reading multitude must note the crossings and the blendings, the counter-runnings and the parallelings. He cannot take an arbitrary stand and say that this tide of affairs began in this place and ended in that; or that this course of events began in such a year and ended in such another. Back of every motion is an impelling power. Back of every individual action lies the basic principles of human conduct. Back of every manifestation of corporate activity may be found a pulsive social force. Neither individual nor social movement can be studied understandingly alone. Each forms a link in a chain whose beginning and end may not be clearly seen, but whose continuity may be inferred from upholding and depending contiguous links.

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