Read Ebook: Lehrbuch der Toxikologie für Tierärzte by Fr Hner Eugen
Font size: Background color: Text color: Add to tbrJar First Page Next Page Prev PageEbook has 3015 lines and 245043 words, and 61 pagesObj. 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" . Therefore to act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature. Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as stated above . Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge. Reply Obj. 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it is thus with irrational creatures. THIRD ARTICLE Whether Human Acts Are Specified by Their End? Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end. Obj. 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a human act does not derive its species from the end. Obj. 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts. Reply Obj. 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion. Reply Obj. 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above . And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act. FOURTH ARTICLE Whether There Is One Last End of Human Life? Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as Dionysius states . Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends. Obj. 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends. Obj. 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no last end of the human will. On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the end. Reply Obj. 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written , God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure." Reply Obj. 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore the Philosopher proves that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process. FIFTH ARTICLE Whether One Man Can Have Several Last Ends? Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many things. Obj. 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others. Obj. 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one. The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above , they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end. Reply Obj. 1: All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end. Reply Obj. 2: Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection. Whether Man Wills All, Whatsoever He Wills, for the Last End? Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics that speculative science is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. Obj. 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end. Reply Obj. 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end. Reply Obj. 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good, which is the ultimate end. SEVENTH ARTICLE Whether All Men Have the Same Last End? Objection 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end. Obj. 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false. Obj. 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end. Reply Obj. 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things. Reply Obj. 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end. EIGHTH ARTICLE Whether Other Creatures Concur in That Last End? Objection 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning--i.e. God--is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says that "God turns all things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says . Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end. Obj. 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end. If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acqnd das Gefl?gel zum Opfer. Sie bestehen aus Strychnin, Phosphor, Arsenik, Sublimat, Baryt, Meerzwiebel usw. +Pferde+ werden ebenfalls am schnellsten und sichersten durch Blaus?ure get?tet, welche am besten intraven?s oder intratracheal beigebracht wird . Statt Blaus?ure kann man auch Strychnin anwenden, weil das Pferd diesem Mittel gegen?ber sehr empfindlich ist. Auch die intraven?se Anwendung von +Chlorbaryum+ wird empfohlen. +Elefanten+ werden ebenfalls am besten mit Blaus?ure get?tet. Man nimmt die 100-200fache Dosis vom Pferd und reicht sie am besten zusammen mit Schnaps oder in Brotwecken . +Ratten+ und +M?use+ k?nnen durch Strychninweizen, Phosphorlatwerge, Ratin usw. vergiftet werden. Auch die +Meerzwiebeln+ werden als ein f?r den Menschen ungiftiges Rattenvertilgungsmittel in der Landwirtschaft angewandt . Das sog. ,,Ratin II" scheint nichts anderes als ein Meerzwiebelpr?parat zu sein . Modifikation der Giftwirkung. Die Intenser says . But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says . Therefore happiness consists especially in honor. Add to tbrJar First Page Next Page Prev Page |
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