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All these critics appear to suggest that the early age of Greece presents us with a more or less homogeneous but undeveloped and quasi-barbarous race which slowly and gradually evolves into something like civilisation in the time of Dracon and Solon. Thus conceived, the homicide-customs of Homer are very similar to those of the Montenegrins of modern times, who have long lived in a condition of social chaos and who accept, in atonement for homicide, a payment of money when there is hardly anyone left to pay it!

Our theory is as follows: there existed in Greece at the period of the Achaean domination two fundamentally distinct social strata, each having a distinct characteristic attitude to homicide, and observing distinct modes of blood-vengeance. The two modes coexisted side by side without affecting or modifying each other, but their coexistence produced a slight confusion of thought and an absence of clear discrimination in language in the Homeric poet who were in contact with the two social strata, and who were familiar with the two modes of vengeance, but who almost ignored the one and exalted the other, out of courtesy to the masters whose praises they sang. These two modes of vengeance, which we will call respectively Achaean and Pelasgian, may be thus described: Amongst the Achaeans the normal penalty for homicide is death. Their system is private vendetta, of a restricted character, such as we have already described in our introductory chapter. The vengeance is quite personal and individual, that is, the murderer alone is liable to the blood feud, which is therefore neither collective nor hereditary. Vengeance is a duty which devolves upon the dead man's sons or brothers, but we may include the possibility of support from a kindred of limited extent: a kindred which may be an embryonic clan, but whose attitude to homicide is quite different from that which normally characterises a clan. Wergeld is not accepted, even though it is known to exist outside the caste: exile is not a recognised appeasement or atonement, but is merely a flight from death, and the Achaean murderer frequently takes refuge with a king or a wealthy man. We shall describe this Achaean system more fully in a later chapter. The Pelasgian mode will be found to be that which we have described in the Introduction as the 'tribal wergeld' mode, though it may have evolved from a more barbarous mode before 1300 B.C. In this system there are three or four recognised alternative penalties: 'wergeld,' which is the normal measure of vengeance or retribution, and which is so frequently associated with tribalism; exile, which involves a formal and solemn expulsion from the 'group,' a serious penalty for anyone born and bred in the atmosphere of tribal life and religion; death, which is rarely inflicted, but is a possible alternative if neither 'wergeld' nor exile is accepted by the murderer or his clan; we may add, with Glotz, though there is no definite Homeric evidence for its existence, the option of slavery or servitude. This is not the slavery which is found in later times in Home and in Greece, when there was a regular slave trade, nor is it the temporary 'slavery' which is involved in being 'kidnapped' and held to ransom--a frequent occurrence in Homer; it is, however, akin to this latter condition, inasmuch as it involves a state of bondage, from which a murderer can be redeemed, not by the payment of such a price as his 'redeemer' can be induced to pay, but by the payment of such valuables as have been determined by long tradition--his quota of the wergeld of the clan.

PROOFS FROM THE TEXT OF HOMER

?????? ?????????, ?????? ?' ????????? ??????.

There are only two passages in Homer in which ????? unmistakably refers to the genuine wergeld penalty. If those passages were missing no one could speak of wergeld as a penalty for homicide in the society described by Homer. We shall now examine those passages with a view to showing that they do not represent the normal system of the dominant Achaean caste, but are merely what Leaf would call 'reminiscences,' traces of a system with which Homer and the Achaeans were familiar, but which they did not adopt or practise amongst themselves.

On the Shield are depicted, amongst other things, two cities, one of which is in a state of siege, the other in a condition of peace. It is with the latter city that we are here concerned. In this city two 'events' are described: the first is a wedding, concerning which we need only say that it is an event of common occurrence, which is not in the least degree novel or abnormal; the second event is a dispute about the ransom of a slain man, which takes place in the ????? of the city, in the presence of the Elders, of the sacred heralds, and of a cheering crowd of people. Leaf's original translation is as follows: 'But the folk were gathered in the assembly-place; for there a strife was arisen, two men striving about the blood-price of a slain man: the one avowed that he had paid all ... but the other denied that he had received aught, manifesting it to the people: and each was fain to obtain consummation on the word of his witness: and the folk were cheering both, as they took part on either side. And heralds kept order among the folk, while the Elders on polished stones were sitting in the sacred circle and holding in their hands staves from loud-voiced heralds. Then before the people they rose up and gave judgment each in turn. And in the midst lay two talents of gold to be given unto him who should plead among them most righteously.'

This is the traditional view, which regards the scene as an investigation by the Elders of the city as to whether a recognised wergeld has or has not been paid. It is followed by Glotz, who proposes however some curious explanations of details, which we shall presently discuss. It is the view which we shall adopt when we have explained more precisely the exact nature of the 'court.'

There is however a second view, adopted by Leaf in 1887, 1892 and 1902, first propounded by M?ncher , and supported by other scholars, which regards the scene as describing the first interference on the part of some higher authority with the chaotic blood-feuds of savages.

Thirdly, there is the view of Lipsius that the trial was a genuine murder-trial, and that the two talents of gold referred to by the poet represented a genuine wergeld. This view is now generally rejected and we shall see presently the objections which militate against it: but our first duty is to formulate the arguments which will induce us to accept the first and to reject the second hypothesis.

If we combine then the arguments based on the text of this Homeric passage with the results of Leaf's latest researches and also with the general principles outlined in our Introductory Chapter, we may conclude that this trial-scene presents us with a genuine wergeld dispute, not within the Achaean caste, but amongst the Pelasgian tribal folk. We have seen that scholars are unanimous in holding that the Shield is of an essentially Mycenaean and therefore Pelasgian pattern. We have quoted Seebohm at length for the connexion between the wergeld-system of homicide-compensation and tribal organisation and control. We have quoted Leaf's recent views as to the probable existence of clans and tribes among the Pelasgian subject-people. The conclusion we have drawn is therefore a practically self-evident deduction from assumed premises.

Assuming then that the court here described by Homer was a group of Pelasgian tribal chiefs or elders who could regularly be appealed to in such disputes, and who would also perform the functions of a murder-court if any person accused of homicide appealed to them to establish his innocence, we shall conclude our discussion by clearing up some minor points of difficulty.

What now, we may ask, is the meaning of ????? in this passage? Homer says:

???? ?' ?????? ??? ?????? ?????? ???????.

Leaf, in 1883, translated thus: 'and each one was fain to obtain consummation on the word of his witness.' Later , when he conceived that there were really two scenes described in the picture, he regarded the ????? as an arbitrator: 'each one relied on an arbitrator to win the suit.' We can only say that while the etymology and use of the word ????? permit of both interpretations, the relation of the verse to its context seems to us immeasurably in favour of the interpretation 'witness.' We may presume that the 'witnesses' were included in the 'people' and were brought forward to prove the actual transference of property which had or had not taken place. They are, therefore, similar to the 'compurgators' who figure so prominently in medieval litigation.

Since Homer, then, the poet of the Achaeans, has given us only two incidental references to wergeld, we are not surprised that he has told us nothing about the details of the system. We may indeed infer that the amount payable was very large, but Glotz reveals how little he is himself acquainted with the system when he asserts that the offender only escaped death at the cost of ruin. 'La ?????,' he says, 'c'est une large, parfois peut-?tre une totale d?possession de l'offenseur au profit de la partie l?s?e. A la mort juste on n'?chappe que par la ruine.' It is probable that the payment took the form of 'women, cattle, or horses.' But in the absence of more definite evidence we must fall back on what we can learn from analogous instances. It is for that reason that we have discussed at so much length the wergeld system in our introductory chapter. We have no doubt that the wergeld revealed by Homer was a genuine wergeld, and not a mere clumsy device for terminating the feuds of savages exhausted by slaughter.

We must now search further, in the text of Homer, for anything he may have to tell us of other alternative penalties existing amongst the Pelasgian people. In this matter we cannot trust to the analysis of Glotz, for he knows of no distinction between Achaeans and Pelasgians, and hence his account is misleading.

It is also doubtful if we can detect any genuine instances of slavery as a penalty for homicide. Glotz calls attention to a very curious custom which is found among some primitive peoples, the custom of compelling a murderer to have himself 'adopted' by the 'family' of the victim. The murderer takes the place of the dead man! Among the Ossetes 'a mother does not hesitate to recognise as her son the man who has deprived her of her son'--but this adoption does not give him a right to succeed to property. Glotz thinks it more than probable that the same custom prevailed in the Homeric epoch, for he regards wergeld as a kind of debt, and slavery was a universal solvent of debt down to the time of Solon, by whom it was still permitted in the case of a daughter who was guilty of misconduct . The offer of a daughter in marriage by Agamemnon to Achilles, in an age when men bought women as venal chattels, Glotz regards as a species of wergeld . He quotes Apollodorus for the eight years 'captivity' of Cadmus with Ares whose son he had murdered--after which Ares gave him his daughter in marriage. For having massacred the Cyclopes, Apollo became a shepherd in the service of Admetus. Heracles, having slain Iphitus, serves Omphale for three years. The only Homeric reference which Glotz mentions is a passage which describes the year's service of Apollo and Poseidon with Laomedon for a sum of money, at the command of Zeus: they built the walls of Troy, but Laomedon refused to pay their wages. As there is here no question of murder, we may say that there is nothing relevant about this Homeric passage. Nor can we attach any weight to legends presented by Apollodorus, for, as we shall see, the abolition of wergeld in the seventh century B.C. made exile the inevitable penalty for murder and left the murderer no property to take away with him, and therefore he had little option but to accept menial service with a stranger.

Hence, while the poems of Homer indicate beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a genuine Pelasgian exile penalty, it is significant that the poet of the Achaeans tends to ignore the exile alternative as he tends also to ignore the wergeld alternative, in the system of penalties for homicide adopted by a tribal people outside the Achaean caste.

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY HOMICIDE

It is time to ask whether Homer has anything to say of this distinction. We will admit that he says nothing which is directly relevant to the question. But we will examine two passages with a view to showing that the distinction was known outside the Achaean caste.

We shall see, later, when we analyse the laws of Plato's homicide-code and of the ancient Hebrew code that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary slaying was much more likely to have arisen in the tribal customs of village-communities accustomed to the most minute differentiations in their wergeld system than in systems emanating from centralised political or religious authority. The Homeric poems give us, it is true, no reliable evidence which would help us to arrive at a definite decision on the existence of such a distinction in early Greece, but from the passages we have cited we may at least extract a suggestion that the distinction was really appreciated, and we have suggested a source from which that sentiment may very easily have sprung.

JUSTIFIABLE AND UNJUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE

We come now to a kindred problem, namely, the question whether the Pelasgians were aware of a difference between justifiable and non-justifiable slaying? Most writers will admit that there was no vengeance set in motion by death on the field of battle. It was a recognised challenge of strength, an ????, the issue of which was accepted as the will of the gods. But in local blood-vengeance, arising, let us suppose, out of failure to pay wergeld, or when the murderer's clan defended him at home or did not expel him and feud followed, was there no distinction between murder and just revenge? Glotz, as we should expect, holds that there was no distinction between murder and revenge. 'Coupable ou non coupable, il est responsable. Qui a vers? du sang doit du sang.' It is thus, certainly, with modern Montenegrins, Albanians and others. But are the creators of Mycenaean civilisation to be compared with these? Glotz conceives the blood-vengeance of early Greece to be what we have called unrestricted vendetta, but this mode of vengeance is not usually associated with settled tribal communities who are otherwise known to accept wergeld, and we maintain that the Pelasgians had reached this stage at the dawn of Greek history. Glotz bases his view for the most part on those numerous 'flights' of murderers which Homer records. Now, these references concern murderers, not avengers of murder; and there is no instance, in Homer, of an avenger of blood becoming in turn the object of vengeance. The non-Homeric instances cited by Glotz, such as the trial of Ares for the murder of Halirrhothius, who had dishonoured his daughter; the flight of Hyettos from Argos to Orchomenus, after slaying Molouros, who was caught in adultery with his wife, are derived from Pausanias, Apollodorus, or Euripides, and are therefore irrelevant for the interpretation of the Homeric age.

COLLECTIVITY IN VENGEANCE

Nothing that has been said in this chapter is incompatible with the view that punishment, in early societies, tends to be collective and hereditary. Feuds of blood must have occasionally occurred amongst the early Pelasgian folk, but we cannot ignore the control of tribal authority, and the Achaean domination which may have acted as a check. However, it is one thing to declare war on a group which refuses to fulfil the law of a district or of a tribe; it is quite another thing to refuse the 'satisfaction' prescribed by custom, and to make a single murder an invariable cause of incessant bloodshed. This is the state of Homeric society as conceived by Glotz, and by most writers on the subject of early Greek homicide. We prefer to emphasise the triumph of reason over passion which is symbolised by a wergeld system of local vengeance, by the worship of common ancestors, real or fictitious, by the early political synoekism of many Greek districts, and by international Amphictyonies of immemorial antiquity. We think that it was in post-Homeric times, when the Achaean control was removed, and the Migrations broke up the solidarity of Pelasgian clans, that Greek societies developed unrestricted vendetta. Glotz has difficulties about the Homeric age. He has to admit that there is no infallible system of collective punishment in Homer. 'Dans l'Iliade et dans l'Odyss?e,' he says, 'les querelles strictement personnelles ne lient plus infailliblement au sort de l'offenseur tous les siens. On n'y voit point, apr?s un meurtre ????????, les vengeurs du sang poursuivre la famille du meurtrier.' The difficulty is obviated by our theory of Achaean restricted vendetta. The vengeance of Achilles for the death of Patroclus is no objection to our theory, as it is not revenge for homicide proper: war is distinct from peace. Achaean kings confiscate property, transfer and destroy whole cities: this is but the autocracy of a quasi-feudal militarism; it is not a punishment of moral guilt.

Euripides makes Tyndareus utter a sentiment regarding the legitimate modes of homicide-vengeance which seems to us to be very applicable to early Greek societies. Tyndareus objects to the infliction of death as a penalty for the slaying of Agamemnon, on the ground that such penalties, in the absence of State-control, would inevitably lead to an indefinite series of retaliations. 'Right well,' he says, 'did our ancestors in olden times enact these ordinances ... they punished with exile, but they suffered no one to slay him in return, for each successive avenger would be liable for bloodshed.... I will support the law, and try to check this brutal murderous practice destructive alike of individual States and of the world.' We shall see later that Euripides is either consciously archaising in this passage or that the view of Tyndareus was somehow preserved in the legend which the dramatist follows. In either case, it seems to us to contain a valuable principle regarding the fear of unrestricted vendetta, of collective and hereditary punishment, which is found in civilised tribal societies in a condition of private vengeance. Such societies have either to abandon civilisation, and to fall back into a chronic state of chaotic barbarism, or to adopt a system of 'social justice' which, by definite rules and regulations, expressive of tribal authority, by public opinion and religious sanctions, prevents, as far as possible, the innocent from suffering with the guilty.

The penalty of wergeld was, in a certain sense, collective because it was diffused throughout the kindred. But this penalty is clearly far removed from the collective punishment of a barbarous hypervengeance. It arises, we have said, from the simple fact that property, in early society, was to a great extent collective or common; and also from the fact that the individual of tribal life was not the isolated personality which feudal and modern civilisations have evolved, but was rather a branch of one great wide-spreading tree in which he lived and moved and had his being. Finally, in regard to the Homeric society, we must remember that the Achaeans stood on quite a separate plane. Amongst them there is little or no suggestion of collective punishment. Achaean military discipline prevented it. Such traces of this punishment as are found in many later legends must be attributed, as we shall see, to post-Homeric influences.

FOOTNOTES

P. 408.

Pp. 253-5.

P. 516.

P. 312.

P. 516.

P. 312 ff.

P. 258.

Minoans or Achaeans.

That is, if he was proved to be innocent of the crime.

???? ?' ???????????? ???????.

????? ??????.

??????? ?' ??? ???? ???????.

P. 130.

Pp. 164, 173.

iii. 4. 2.

P. 173.

Apollod. ii. 6. 2.

Seebohm, p. 328.

Seebohm, p. 323.

Seebohm, pp. 93-4.

P. 42.

P. 71.

P. 129.

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