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INTRODUCTION v

THE NEUTRAL MERCHANT

The 'Letters of Historicus'--General Position of the Neutral Merchant--Use of Neutral Flags by Merchantmen to Escape Capture or Destruction--First American Note to Great Britain--British Interim Reply--The Complete Reply--First American Note to Germany--German Reply--Evolution of the Doctrines of Contraband of War and Blockade--Meaning of Neutrality--Contraband of War--Conditional Contraband--Declaration of Paris as to Freedom of Neutral Goods and of Enemy Goods under Neutral Flag--Prize Courts--The Conflicting Rights of Neutral Merchants and of Belligerents--The Right and Duty of Search--Doctrine of Continuous Voyages--Embargo--Blockade--The New Policy of the British Government--Foreign Enlistment--Proclamations of Neutrality.

The neutral merchant is the centre round which the principal doctrines of international law dealing with neutrality have gathered. It seems strange at first that in time of war the commercial rights of a mere money-making civilian should invariably form the subject of endless discussions; but this civilian really holds a very important position in the waging of war; it could not go on without him. Each belligerent has need of him, and it is essential to each to prevent the other from satisfying that need. To block the enemy's communications with the neutral merchant is one of the surest ways of ending the war. To this end many ingenious things have been devised, and as many equally ingenious to counteract them; and in this the merchant's fertile brain has materially assisted. The problem is a complex one, for each belligerent as a buyer must strive to keep him in a good humour, but as a fighter must do all he can to thwart him. As for the neutral merchant himself, he is calmly indifferent to the merits of the fight; nothing pleases him so much as to be 'Jack of Both Sides.' He will take all he can get from one side and cry out for more from the other. When the War is over we may muse philosophically on some aspects of the Protest which the United States Government has addressed to Great Britain on behalf of its merchants; for the present, with all its serious issues hanging in the balance, the American Notes require careful study, for they themselves raise an issue as serious as any which the War has raised--whether Great Britain has been true to the principles she has so often preached, or whether the German accusation, or the American suggestion, that she has violated them can be substantiated; whether, when all is over, we shall be able to say proudly that it has been War with Honour.

Two Notes have been addressed to Great Britain, and it will be convenient to refer at once to the second Note, which deals with the use by our merchantmen of neutral flags. The neutral merchant is directly concerned with this custom of the sea, for he may have cargo on board, and if this means of deceiving the enemy's warships is declared to be illegal he runs the chance of its being sent to the bottom.

The Government of the United States reserved for future consideration the legality and propriety of the deceptive use of the flag of a neutral Power in any case for the purpose of avoiding capture; but pointed out that the occasional use of the flag of a neutral or of an enemy under stress of immediate pursuit, and to deceive an approaching enemy, was

a very different thing from the explicit sanction by a belligerent Government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a neutral Power within certain portions of the high seas which, it is presumed, will be frequented with hostile warships. A formal declaration of such a policy for the general misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardises the vessels of a neutral visiting those waters in a peculiar degree by raising the presumption that they are of belligerent nationality, regardless of the flag they may carry.

The Note declared that the United States would view with anxious solicitude any such general use of its flag; it would afford no protection to British vessels, it would be a serious and constant menace to the lives and vessels of American citizens, and a measure of responsibility for their loss would be imposed on the Government of Great Britain.

The reply of the British Government was short and to the point. It dwelt on the fact that the Merchant Shipping Act sanctions the use of the British flag by foreign merchantmen in time of war for the purpose of evading the enemy; that instances are on record when United States vessels availed themselves of this facility during the American Civil War, and that, therefore, it would be contrary to fair expectation if now, when the conditions are reversed, the United States and neutral nations were to grudge to British ships liberty to take similar action. 'The British Government,' it continued, 'have no intention of advising their merchant shipping to use foreign flags as a general practice, or to resort to them otherwise than for escaping capture or destruction.' Finally, the responsibility for the loss of neutral vessels in such circumstances must fall on the nation which had deliberately disregarded the obligations recognised by all civilised nations in connexion with the seizure of merchant ships.

I pass now to the more serious matter of the Note of friendly protest of the 28th of December, which was an amplification of one already presented on the 7th of November. It opens with the declaration that the present condition of the trade of the United States, resulting from frequent seizures and detentions of cargoes destined to neutral European ports, has become so serious as to require a candid statement of the view of the United States Government that the British policy is an infringement of the rights of its citizens, and denies to neutral commerce the freedom to which it is entitled by the law of nations. An improvement had been confidently awaited on account of the statement of the Foreign Office that the British Government 'were satisfied with guarantees offered by the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish Governments as to the non-exportation of contraband goods when consigned to named persons in the territories of those Governments.' But although nearly five months had passed since the War began, it was a matter of deep regret to find that the British Government

have not materially changed their policy and do not treat less injuriously ships and cargoes passing between neutral ports in the peaceful pursuit of lawful commerce which belligerents should protect rather than interrupt. The greater freedom from detention and seizure which was confidently expected to result from consigning shipments to definite consignees rather than 'to order' is still awaited.

The general principle is then laid down that, 'seeing that peace, and not war, is the normal relation between nations,'

the commerce between countries which are not belligerents should not be interfered with by those at war unless such interference is manifestly an imperative necessity to protect their national safety, and then only to the extent that it is a necessity.

But articles on the list of absolute contraband consigned to neutral countries from America have been seized and detained 'on the ground that the countries to which they were destined have not prohibited the exportation of such articles.' Italy had prohibited the export of copper, and shipments to Italian consignees or 'to order' cannot be exported or transhipped; copper can only pass through that country if it is in transit to another country. Yet the British Foreign Office had 'declined to affirm that copper shipments to Italy will not be molested on the high seas.'

In the case of conditional contraband there is a presumption of innocent use when it is destined to neutral territory; yet the British authorities had seized and detained cargoes without

being in possession of facts which warranted a reasonable belief that the shipments had in reality a belligerent destination as that term is used in international law. Mere suspicion is not evidence, and doubts should be resolved in favour of neutral commerce, not against it.

Cargoes had, in fact, been seized 'because of a belief that, though not originally so intended by the shippers, they will ultimately reach' the enemy. A consignment of conditional contraband shipped to a neutral port does not raise a presumption of enemy destination; such a presumption is directly opposed to Lord Salisbury's statement, made during the South African war, as to foodstuffs which, 'though having a hostile destination, can be considered as contraband only if they are for the enemy forces. It is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used. It must be shown that was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure.' As to concealed contraband, it is conceded that there is a right to detain neutral ships when there is sufficient evidence to justify belief that contraband articles are in their cargoes; but the ships cannot be taken into port and there detained 'for the purpose of searching generally for contraband, or upon presumptions created by special municipal enactment which are clearly at variance with international law and practice.' Many of the industries of the United States are suffering 'because their products are denied long-established markets in European countries which, though neutral, are contiguous to the nations at war.' The effect on trade is not entirely cured by reimbursements for damages suffered when an enemy destination has not been established; 'the injury is to American commerce as a whole through the hazard of the enterprise and the repeated diversion of goods from established markets.'

Resolved into its simplest expression, the complaint is a criticism of the way in which the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' has been applied by the British Government; but there is also a veiled criticism of the doctrine itself; and, by way of further complaint, it is pointed out that the embargoes which have been declared in certain countries have proved insufficient to prevent the doctrine being applied. As to the principle asserted that doubts are to be resolved in favour of neutral commerce, it has no warrant in common sense, for it puts a premium on the neutral merchant's ingenuity, an ingenuity which has itself given rise to the doctrine of 'continuous voyages.' Seeing that commerce is in the balance against a nation's existence, the doubt must obviously be resolved in favour of the more important consideration. The Note is also open to the general criticism that it is based on the position of the vendor and ignores the purchaser. But the true criterion of destination must often be found in the intentions of the neutral purchaser of which the neutral vendor may be ignorant.

An interim reply was sent by the British Government on the 7th of January. It begins with a cordial concurrence in the general principle that a belligerent should not interfere with trade between neutrals unless such interference is necessary to protect the belligerent's national safety, and then only to the extent to which this is necessary; with this qualification, however, that

The figures showing the export of copper from the United States in 1913 and 1914 to Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland are then compared, and their astonishing increases duly noted. The conclusion is very clear.

With such figures the presumption is very strong that the bulk of the copper consigned to these countries has recently been intended not for their own use, but for that of a belligerent who cannot import it direct.

The reply deals also with the seizure of foodstuffs, but it is unnecessary, in view of subsequent action taken in regard to them, to refer to this part of the document. It also mentions a somewhat unusual complaint, not included in the American Note, of our own embargo on rubber, imposed in consequence of a new trade in exporting rubber from the United States in suspiciously large quantities to neutral countries, which had sprung up since the war. The complaint is not very intelligible, because it looks at embargo from the wrong point of view. The right point of view is explained later in this article.

The full reply of the British Government was dated the 10th of February. It contained the very important declaration that our action against neutral vessels 'has been limited to vessels on their way to enemy ports or ports in neutral countries adjacent to the theatre of war, because it is only through such ports that the enemy introduces the supplies which he requires for carrying on the war.' In other words, the importance of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' at the present time is emphasised; and its necessity is demonstrated by a further review of trade statistics, which led to the inevitable conclusions 'that not only has the trade of the United States with the neutral countries in Europe been maintained as compared with previous years, but also that a substantial part of this trade was, in fact, trade intended for the enemy countries going through neutral ports by routes to which it was previously unaccustomed.'

But even more important is the opinion deliberately expressed that international law, like every other judge-made law, is a live body of principles which can and must keep abreast of the times. Its rules are not arbitrarily devised as occasions arise, but are based on principles which have developed with the progress of the world. Any apparent changes in the law which Great Britain has introduced are not arbitrary inventions which have in view merely the crushing of Germany, but are justified by well-known principles applied to new conditions. The process of adaptation is no new one. The advent of steam-power had a notable influence on the development of the law, for the facilities introduced by steamers and railways, while they simplified the task of the neutral merchant in contraband, had enormously magnified the difficulties of the belligerent.

The question in issue can be stated in almost primitive fashion. Are the rules which governed the rights of belligerents when there were no railways, to govern them when the transit of contraband over the frontier of a neutral and a belligerent State has been made so easy? The answer is not an absolute negative; it is that the old principles are living principles and are capable of extension to meet the new occasions.

But to explain the reasons for a step which has already been taken and to find sound reasons for a step which has to be taken are two different things. The first requires reasoning power, the second imagination; and I find this in the position boldly taken up and courageously insisted on, that the growth in size of ocean liners has rendered a further amplification of the old rules necessary. They must be brought into port for examination.

The final destination of the cargo in this particular voyage was left so skilfully open ... that it was not quite easy to prove, with that certainty which American Courts require, the intention, which it seemed plain must have really existed. Thus to prove it required that truth should be collated from a variety of sources, darkened and disguised; from others opened as the cause advanced, and by accident only; from coincidences undesigned, and facts that were circumstantial. Collocations and comparisons, in short, brought largely their collective force in aid of evidence that was more direct.

To introduce the rigid rules of evidence necessary to a common-law action in a question which is not a lawsuit at all, but an inquiry, would obviously cripple the effectiveness of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages'; the occasions with which that doctrine deals have by force of circumstances become the most important source of supply of those commodities which a belligerent must at all hazards prevent his enemy obtaining. And if we go back to the root-principle, that the whole law and every part of it depend on the right of self-defence, no stronger argument is necessary to justify the principle laid down in this case, nor for the provisions of the Order in Council of the 29th of October, which throw the burden of proof of his innocence on the neutral owner of contraband.

I now come to the Note to Germany of the 12th of February, delivered in consequence of the notification of her under-sea policy, and for which 'Warning' is the only appropriate term. The statement of the principles set at defiance is introduced by the satirical formula 'It is unnecessary to remind,' the whole object of the Note being to remind the German Government that the interference with the freedom of the sea is limited to search and blockade, and that in the absence of effective blockade the belligerent nationality or contraband character of the cargo must be determined before a vessel may be destroyed.

To this Note came the German reply which set forth England's iniquities and violations of international law, which were in startling contrast to the scrupulous observance of 'valid international rules regarding naval warfare' by Germany. There is a complacent reference to the American Note to Great Britain of the 28th of December, which sets out the details of our iniquities 'sufficiently, though not exhaustively'; but the main interest of the document is its method of dealing with the duties of neutral States towards Germany.

Neutrals have been unable to prevent the interruption of their commerce with Germany, which is contrary to international laws.

Germany is as good as cut off from her overseas supply by the silent or protesting toleration of neutrals not only in regard to such goods as are absolute contraband, but also in regard to such as, according to the acknowledged law before the war, are only conditional contraband or not contraband at all. Great Britain, on the other hand, is, with the toleration of neutral Governments, not only supplied with such goods as are not contraband or only conditional contraband, but with goods which are regarded by Great Britain, if sent to Germany, as absolute contraband--namely, provisions, industrial raw material, etc.--and even with goods which have always indubitably been regarded as absolute contraband.

There follows a reference 'with greatest emphasis' to the enormous traffic in arms which is being 'carried on between American firms and Germany's enemies'; after which come two sentences most typical of German occultness:

Germany fully comprehends that the practice of right and toleration of wrong on the part of neutrals are matters absolutely at the discretion of neutrals and involve no formal violation of neutrality.... If it is the formal right of neutrals to take no steps to protect their legitimate trade with Germany, and even to allow themselves to be influenced in the direction of conscious wilful restriction of their trade, on the other hand, they have a perfect right, which they unfortunately do not exercise, to cease contraband trade, especially in arms, with Germany's enemies.

The involutions of these astonishing sentences are worthy of the White Queen at her best, and it is quite a difficult exercise to arrive at their meaning. So far as I have been able to get at it, it is something like this:--Trade is free; you neutral merchants have a right to trade with Germany as with Great Britain; why don't you? That would be the 'practice of right.' Germany has as much right to have you trade with her as Great Britain has; why do you deny her that right? You allow yourselves rather 'to be influenced in the direction of conscious wilful restriction' . Of course you have the right to take no steps to protect your legitimate trade with Germany, and you take none ; that is 'the toleration of wrong.' And so you cease to trade with Germany. But you have also a perfect right to cease trading in contraband with Great Britain. Why don't you? In her case you do not allow yourselves 'to be influenced in the direction of conscious wilful restriction.' To all of which the neutral merchants reply: When you begin to make an appreciable attack upon our trade with Great Britain and seize our cargoes, then you may be sure that we shall be influenced 'in the direction of conscious wilful restriction' of that trade also. But until that time arrives, we regret that we cannot take the risk of having to run the gauntlet of the British Fleet. In all seriousness these mysterious sentences mean no more than that Germany has lost such influence upon the sea as she ever had, and the neutral merchant has made a note of it and governs himself accordingly. Therefore the traffic in arms, in spite of her pathetic protests, must go on.

So much for the Notes and the Answers, and I pass to the realm of international law. In a recent debate in Parliament a noble Lord suggested that, in view of German disregard of it, we need not be 'too fastidious' in our application of its principles. Even at the best of times, before war shook things to their foundations, the layman was disposed to look on it as a thing of shreds and patches. I am sure he would be surprised to hear that the principles are coherent, and that there is a thread of simple common-sense running through all the various doctrines. The fate of the Empire depends on the action which the Government takes on these important questions, its honour on this action being strictly in accordance with the law which the nations have agreed to. I make no apology, therefore, for treading once more the well-beaten track, for I take it that it is the business of the good citizen to know what he is talking about, and in order to help him I shall begin at the very beginning. And the beginning is War.

At the outbreak of war the nations are divided into two classes: those that are fighting and those that are not. To give them their scientific names, they are belligerents and neutrals. With the laws of war I do not concern myself, but only with those principles by which neutrals are supposed to govern themselves in order to avoid being swept into the vortex.

The only means by which this most desirable object can be achieved is by steadfastly bearing in mind the natural consequence of meddling in other people's frays. It gives rise to the very simple maxim 'He who joins himself to my enemy makes himself my enemy and may be treated as such.' For the world's peace the doctrine 'He that is not with me is against me' finds no place in the maxims of nations. Now there is a root-principle of neutrality, and if it is once let go all the subordinate principles will fly off and become isolated bodies careering through intellectual space, and doing an incalculable amount of damage. This principle is, that neutrality is a state appertaining to the Governments of the non-belligerent countries, and to the Governments alone. Azuni says that 'the state of neutrality is not, nor can be, a new state, but a continuation of a former one, by the Sovereign who has no wish to change it.' But neutrality has nothing whatever to do with the individual, and all the puzzles which confuse the public mind arise from the fact that the word 'neutral' is applied indiscriminately to Governments and to individuals. The importance of appreciating this is manifest, for if it is unsound the German case, in which the contrary doctrine appears and reappears over and over again, is right; if it is sound that case tumbles to pieces. It is the persistence with which the German Foreign Office has dragged the opposite contention in by the heels on every possible occasion which makes it so necessary to insist on the recognition of this principle. The burden of its reply to the United States, the condition on which Germany will abandon its evil under-water practices, is that this principle should be given up, and the neutral trade in arms with its enemies declared illegal. If it could be thought for a moment that the United States was likely to be beguiled into abandoning it, then the peace of the world would indeed be in jeopardy. But, unfortunately for the Germans, the Americans know full well what the principle means, and the place it holds in the international system, for them to give even the slightest hint that this is possible.

What, then, does neutrality mean? That the Government of a non-belligerent State must do nothing to assist either belligerent, by providing him with arms, or ships, or men, or money. It is not difficult to understand why neutrality is not applicable to the individuals of the non-belligerent States. Nations subsist by international commerce, and there is no reason why, because two of them go to war, all their trade with the others should be declared illegal. Therefore we get at once to this axiom, that war does not affect neutral trade with either belligerent, but the merchants in neutral countries are entitled to carry on business with them. And so the neutral merchant makes his first appearance on the scene.

Certain subsidiary questions arise at this point. First, the familiar distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. This follows in direct sequence from what has already been said. The belligerent is not fighting the civil population, but only the enemy Government and its forces. This compels him to interfere with neutral trade in everything that enables that Government to maintain its forces. But how to draw the line between things destined for the civil population and those destined for the forces, for things destined for the civilian may be serviceable to those forces, and may, in fact, be used by them.

This principle was adhered to by us during the early months of the War, and was expressly referred to as having guided our action in Sir Edward Grey's interim reply, of the 7th of January, to the American Note. But the War has revolutionised many ideas, and among them those which had led to the adoption of this principle by Great Britain in the face of the opposing contentions of other countries in the past, notably France and Germany. In his final reply to the Note, sent on the 10th of February, Sir Edward Grey frankly stated that 'in the absence of some certainty that the rule would be respected by both parties to this conflict, we feel great doubt whether it would be regarded as an established principle of international law.' Further, he pointed out certain new features in the circumstances in which the War was being waged which tended to show that an adherence to the old principle would be an unjustifiable restriction on our power of striking the enemy-- the existence of an elaborate machinery for the supply of foodstuffs for the use of the German army from overseas; the practical disappearance of the distinction between the civil population and the armed forces of Germany; the power taken by the German Government to requisition food for the use of the army, which rendered it probable that goods imported for civil use would be consumed by the army if military exigencies required it.

I confess that there are many considerations which challenge the logic of the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, and give it more the character of a humanitarian concession. It introduces a new bone of contention between belligerents and neutral traders, and it opens up the grave danger of concealed contraband in cargoes which are themselves innocent: the concealment of copper, for example, in bales of cotton. In view of the more rigorous rule of blockade where the distinction disappears, it seems more in the nature of a preliminary measure in the process of throttling the enemy; the first turn of the screw, and a suggestion of sterner measures which are in store.

Another point requires explanation. Of course all enemy ships upon the seas are lawful prize. But it strikes one at once that here is a departure from the principle that you do not make war upon the civil population, for merchant ships are civilian property. The neutral merchant has, however, been looked after, for the Declaration of Paris has proclaimed that 'neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.' But in the converse case, it would not seem reasonable that enemy property in neutral ships should escape capture. The Declaration of Paris, however, steps in with the arbitrary rule that 'the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.' It cannot be said that this rule has done much to safeguard the 'freedom of the sea' for neutral vessels, for there is no doubt that guns consigned to Germany discovered on an American ship on a voyage from Galveston to Pernambuco would be lawfully seized; and as the guns may be seized the vessel may be detained and searched. But practical considerations work in favour of the neutral merchant. Not all the hosts of the Allied Fleets would be sufficient for the stupendous work which would be involved in putting this right into practice; therefore good sense has decreed that the destination of a ship to an enemy port shall be adopted as the practical working factor in its application, at least in the case of conditional contraband. But this has engendered the idea, which certainly is no part of the rule in its naked simplicity, that neutral ships sailing to neutral ports can carry enemy cargoes of contraband with impunity. Enemy destination is supposed alone to afford a presumption that there is contraband for the enemy on board; but if there were any doubt that the idea is erroneous, the words 'whatever be their destination,' in a judgment of Lord Stowell's, to which I shall presently refer, must dispel it.

But the detention of neutral ships at sea, and the seizure of the contraband that they carry to the enemy, can be put much higher than a mere belligerent right; nor does it spring solely from the vindictive principle that the neutral aiding the enemy becomes an enemy; it is based on the supreme right of self-defence. It is the inevitable counterpoise to the right of the neutral merchant to continue trading, even in contraband, in spite of war. The importance of this trading right to the neutral merchant is the measure of the importance of this defensive right to the belligerent.

The right of the neutral merchant was put on the large commercial ground by Mr. Huskisson: 'Of what use would be our skill in building ships, manufacturing arms, and preparing instruments of war, if equally to sell them to all belligerents were a breach of neutrality?' But it can be put on a still larger ground. Without it the small nations would go to the wall. If there were such a doctrine as Germany now contends for, a great country with unlimited resources could speedily annihilate all the weak nations one after the other. There is no such doctrine as that when war is declared the warring nations are to fight it out with their own resources only. It is not the duty of neutral merchants to keep the ring and let the best man win. Sentiment does not come into the question. The neutral merchant may serve that side which he earnestly desires should win; but the other belligerent has the extreme penalty of confiscation in his hands, and sentiment must inevitably fade into the background.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that the two great war doctrines are, the right of the neutral merchant to trade in contraband, and the right of the belligerent nations to seize his cargoes. Combined, they make the simple principle that the neutral merchant may supply contraband to either side subject only to the risk of seizure by the other. 'The right of the neutral to transport,' says Kent, 'and of the hostile Power to seize, are conflicting rights, and neither party can charge the other with a criminal act.'

But the principle of seizure is still in a very crude state; and seeing that all cargoes destined for the enemy are not liable to seizure, and that for practical reasons it is neither possible nor advisable to bring in every cargo for adjudication in the Prize Courts, a supplementary right has been devised, known as the 'right of search.' It is the first step in the seizure, and, on the one hand, affords the belligerent an opportunity of letting non-contraband cargo go free; on the other hand, it gives the owner of the cargo an immediate opportunity of proving its innocent character. The right of search is often stated as an independent right, but it is in reality secondary to the right of seizure, and references to it obviously apply equally to the right of seizure. As to its unlimited nature I need do no more than quote the well-known words of Lord Stowell in the case of the Swedish convoy. It is incontrovertible

that the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be their destination, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation.... This right is so clear in principle that no man can deny it who admits the legality of maritime capture, because if you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether there is property that can be captured, it is impossible to capture.

But the heart of the neutral merchant is desperately ingenious, especially when his country is contiguous to the theatre of war, and no sooner had he obtained the inch to which practical considerations made him appear to be entitled than he developed it into an ell of his own imagining. He argued thus: A neutral vessel bound to an enemy port is liable to detention, because the presumption is that she has cargo for the enemy, and that her cargo is probably contraband; the presumption also is that cargoes on board a vessel bound for a neutral port are not destined for the enemy, even though they may be contraband; nothing easier than to bring them across the sea in a neutral vessel with a neutral destination; all that remains to be done is to pass them on to the belligerent, either transhipping them into another vessel and sending it down the coast, out of the way of the attentions of the enemy's cruisers, or better still, if the neutral and belligerent countries are contiguous, by rail across the border. And the best of the plan is that the shipper on the other side of the water, say some innocent merchant in copper in the United States, need know nothing about it, so that if by chance the cargo does get seized he will do all the shouting.

With this problem, devised in some such human fashion, the United States was faced during the Civil War, and the Judges settled it in characteristic and logical manner. They discovered the doctrine of 'continuous voyages.' It is nothing more than the simple application of elementary principles, and is arrived at by the elimination of the presumption of innocence which the voyage to the neutral port raised. All presumptions may be rebutted, and this one manifestly. 'Be the destination what it may,' the right of search existed; the presumption had only been allowed to grow because it was convenient. If goods destined for the enemy reached him by way of a neutral port, that port was only an intermediate destination; the ultimate consignee was the enemy, and there was a continuous voyage to him from the port of shipment. Therefore the seizure, and therefore the search, were justified, and could not be denied merely because 'the final destination of the cargo was left so skilfully open.'

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