Read Ebook: The neutral merchant in relation to the law of contraband of war and blockade under the order in Council of 11th March 1915 by Piggott Francis Taylor
Font size: Background color: Text color: Add to tbrJar First Page Next Page Prev PageEbook has 158 lines and 33203 words, and 4 pagesWith this problem, devised in some such human fashion, the United States was faced during the Civil War, and the Judges settled it in characteristic and logical manner. They discovered the doctrine of 'continuous voyages.' It is nothing more than the simple application of elementary principles, and is arrived at by the elimination of the presumption of innocence which the voyage to the neutral port raised. All presumptions may be rebutted, and this one manifestly. 'Be the destination what it may,' the right of search existed; the presumption had only been allowed to grow because it was convenient. If goods destined for the enemy reached him by way of a neutral port, that port was only an intermediate destination; the ultimate consignee was the enemy, and there was a continuous voyage to him from the port of shipment. Therefore the seizure, and therefore the search, were justified, and could not be denied merely because 'the final destination of the cargo was left so skilfully open.' And now the pendulum swings back, and in the doctrine of embargo the really neutral merchant comes into his own. 'Embargo' is the action taken by a neutral Government in regard to goods which have been declared to be contraband by one or other of the belligerents; and the point to be emphasised is that it springs directly out of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages.' In order to prevent neutral ships destined to its ports with goods which one of the belligerents treats as contraband being detained and searched at sea, it prohibits the export of those goods from its own ports. The embargo satisfies the belligerent that these goods will not go out of the neutral country, and therefore will not get directly or indirectly into the hands of the enemy; he therefore feels justified in letting those ships go free, for the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' cannot apply. Now the reason for the embargo is that the merchants of the neutral country require the commodity for themselves. Suppose, for example, that Spanish merchants require copper for their own use; then in order to ensure cargoes of copper coming direct to Spanish ports without being interfered with at sea by the search of belligerent cruisers, the Spanish Government might put an embargo on copper: that is to say, might prohibit its export. There could be no better evidence that the Spanish merchants were importing the copper for their own trade, and that none of it would get through to the enemy. I can therefore best describe an embargo thus: It is action taken by a neutral Government to protect those of its merchants who do not desire to engage in trade in contraband from the consequences which would result from the action of those who do. There is only one point in connexion with this doctrine which requires attention. Is the action thus taken by the neutral Government a breach of its neutrality to the other belligerent? For, undoubtedly, it does act favourably to the belligerent who has declared the goods to be contraband. The answer is simple. Once admit the strict logic of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages,' it follows that an embargo is a measure neither directed against one belligerent nor imposed to favour the other. It is simply a measure of self-defence, taken in order to prevent the national industries from suffering from the undoubted belligerent right of detention at sea and possible seizure. There are other occasions in which an embargo may be resorted to, as in the case of the embargo on rubber imported by Great Britain to which reference has been made above. That is purely a municipal question with which international law can have no concern. And now I come to the last point of all, blockade, which is the supreme manifestation of force at sea for the purpose of crushing the enemy. Here all minor considerations vanish. The artificial distinction between absolute and conditional contraband disappears; there is no longer any free list; neutral as well as enemy cargoes are subject to seizure, whether going to or coming from the blockaded port. The humanitarian concession that war is not made on the civil population finds no place; indeed, blockade derives much of its efficacy from the pressure which the strangling process brings to bear on that population. It has been described as a siege carried on at sea, but under somewhat more elastic conditions than a land siege. It is a convenient comparison, because all the outcry against its inhumanity is silenced by the recollection of Paris in 1870, and the vision of what Paris would have been in 1914 if the German plan had succeeded. It is rigorous, almost brutal, but it is war, and war admits of no half-measures which come within the code of civilisation; and this measure, extreme though it be, has long been recognised as legitimate warfare. Nor is there any conventional limitation as to the time when it may be resorted to. Coming as it naturally does at the end of the discussion to which other principles have led up, it might appear as if custom had decreed that it should only be resorted to after all other measures had failed. But there is nothing to prevent a war starting with a blockade; nothing, that is to say, in the theory of the subject, though there are any number of practical reasons which make it improbable. I presume, however, that if a great maritime Power were at war with a State which had only a miniature fleet, a blockade of its coasts would be the speediest and, therefore, the most humane way of bringing it to a conclusion. Certainly there is no rule or custom which prevents a Power at war from putting forth its full strength at once. The ascending scale is easier for purposes of study; the mind grasps smaller things more easily, and they prepare the way for the appreciation of the greater things. But it is not by a process of logical development that we reach blockade after a study of contraband. Blockade is treated last more conveniently because it involves the greatest development of force against the enemy; but it would have been more logical to have begun at the other end of the scale, starting with the greatest exhibition of force, and letting the series of rules emerge in diminishing strength. In view of what remains to be said, it is of great importance to appreciate that the incarnation of sea-power, blockade, which cuts the enemy off absolutely from the outer world, lies at one end of the scale of what one belligerent may do to the other, and the seizure of contraband on a neutral ship going to an enemy port, which cuts the enemy off but partially, lies at the other end. There can then be no difficulty in justifying what comes in between. But the most curious point is that it is only when we come to the recognition of this extreme manifestation of force that we meet with artificial rules. A blockade must be 'effective.' Yet this word, as to the meaning of which in its ordinary use there can be no doubt, is given in treaties and by the authorities a wholly artificial meaning. Sometimes it includes the exact contrary to effectiveness, as that 'A blockade is not regarded as raised if the blockading force is temporarily withdrawn on account of stress of weather': during which the adventurous skipper may run in. It is not necessary to labour the point; but it is necessary, when measures short of 'blockade' have been taken by England, that the full extent of what blockade pressure upon neutral trade means should be understood. In order to determine what characterises a blockaded port, that denomination is given only where there is, by the disposition of the Power which attacks it with ships, stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering. A blockade is valid and legitimate, although there be no design to attack or reduce by force the port or arsenal to which it is applied, and that the fact of the blockade, with due notice given to neutral Powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the blockade. These two quotations embody the principles of the English prize law. Article 17 of the Declaration of London contains a modification of them, and provides that 'neutral vessels may not be captured for breach of blockade except within the area of operations of the war-ships detailed to render the blockade effective.' P.S.--I must briefly refer to two questions which appear at first sight to conflict with the principles advanced in this article--Foreign Enlistment, and the King's Proclamations of Neutrality. It prohibits warlike enterprise, but it does not interfere with commercial adventure. A subject of the Crown may sell a ship of war, as he may sell a musket, to either belligerent with impunity; nay, he may even despatch it for sale to the belligerent port. But he may not take part in the overt act of making war upon a people with whom his Sovereign is at peace. The purview of the Foreign Enlistment Act is to prohibit a breach of allegiance on the part of the subject against his own Sovereign, not to prevent transactions in contraband with the belligerent. Its object is to prohibit private war, and not to restrain private commerce. It is only when it has become the subject of agreement between two or more States that 'foreign enlistment' assumes an international as well as a municipal character. I presume that this municipal character has not been lost by the inclusion of the duty to prevent the fitting out or arming of vessels in Article 8 of the Hague Convention, No. 13, of 1907, relating to the duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War. Mr. Norman Angell is a serious writer. He has detected the weak points in what is called the 'arbitrament of war,' and has formulated his indictment against it in a series of concrete propositions. The wilderness of the world's foolishness so re-echoed with his words that some thought they saw the wild rose blossoming. Yet, though the wilderness still breeds the thistle, his theories rested on a substratum of fact, and set people thinking when he first spoke to them. But his last excursion into the regions of the Unattainable has no such merit; he has been busy dreaming other men's dreams. He foresees this contingency, which 'English opinion has absolutely failed to envisage,' that at the conclusion of the War America will see to it that 'sea-law as it stands, and as America has accepted it,' is 'changed altogether.' He says that 'there is in England not the faintest realisation that the inevitable outcome of the present contraband and blockade difficulties will be an irresistible movement in America, for the neutralization of the high seas, or, failing that, their domination by the American Navy.' So much of this as relates to England is perfectly true; there has not been 'a line of discussion concerning it in the Press,' for the all-sufficient reason that it is the 'very coinage' of Mr. Norman Angell's brain, the 'bodiless creation' of his ecstasy. That 'profound conflict of policy' which, after unnumbered years, is to end in the transfer of the command of the sea across the Atlantic is not 'even being discussed in England'; and it is therefore consoling to know that 'it is probable that very many Americans themselves do not realise clearly how this dispute is developing, and how the United States will be pushed to take a stand for a profound alteration of the entire maritime situation.' With this the phantasy of the 'neutralization of the sea' might be dismissed. It is a dangerous topic to discuss at this time, especially in America, with so uncertain a knowledge of 'sea-law' as Mr. Norman Angell displays; for others besides pacifist doctrinaires are making great play with it to the same audience--to wit, our enemies. Yet this advocate of peace threatens us with war if we will not accept his great illusion--war with the United States! And in order to avoid this conflict, 'which certainly no one who wishes well to the two countries would care to contemplate,' he demands the sacrifice of every principle on which we found our belief that Right must ultimately become Might. I can only assume that he does not see that the result would be the greater prevalence of the German doctrine that Might is Supreme. The 'neutralization of the sea' is therefore a convenient formula which may be substituted for that occult paragraph of the German reply to the American Note of the 12th of February, the meaning of which I have endeavoured to give in my first article: that little lecture to the American trader on the subject of 'the practice of right,' and 'the toleration of wrong.' The paraphrase of this new formula is more easy. First: wars shall cease upon the high seas; and as 'men-of-war' obviously include transports, wars will thenceforward be confined to continents; bellicose islands will never again be allowed to participate. Permanent peace will thus be established in part of the world; and for the rest, seeing that you cannot expect to achieve everything at once, there must be just one more war, in which Germany will reduce Russia to impotence, absorb the small States, and crush France and Italy without the interference of troublesome over-sea soldiers; after which the beatific vision of a permanent Teutonic peace. Secondly: with regard to so much of the formula as relates to neutrals, the justice of it must become apparent if you introduce as a prelude the tearful appeal so often heard of late from Berlin--'You pray for peace, and yet you arm our enemies to fight.' It is unkind to substitute for this--'You will not let us crush our enemies in our own way'; yet it is its exact equivalent; and reduced to a practical proposition it means this, that when nations go to war they must fight with their own resources, which not even the dreamiest of the Pacifists would assent to, for then those little nations, in whose prosperity Mr. Norman Angell so much believes, would go to the wall. It would give the strong States the power to crush them, picking their quarrel when and how they will. But if you will not agree to this so-simple proposition, then, for goodness' as well as for profit's sake, be logical and trade with both belligerents alike; do not let yourselves 'be influenced in the direction of conscious wilful restriction' by so trivial a matter as the 'command of the sea.' Sea-power on which it rests must be abolished altogether, which would be a great step towards permanent peace. With the bearing of the 'command of the sea' upon the third phrase of its 'neutralization' this article specially concerns itself. All this and more lies between the extremes of Mr. Norman Angell's threat; either this, or the United States will take the command of the sea into its own hands. One may reasonably doubt whether this view commends itself to President Wilson; whether it has even entered the minds of the 'influential backers' of the demand for an enormously increased American fleet. Yet, if I may say it with profound respect, it is only another manifestation of the fundamental misunderstanding of the law of war which characterises the Protest itself. 'It is with no mere idle use of high-sounding phrase that Great Britain once more appears to vindicate the freedom of the sea.' Thus we spoke in the argument in the Behring Sea Arbitration. And we may continue so to speak with clearest conscience; for a careful scrutiny will show that the principle of the Order in Council is new, if you will, but in legitimate sequence from well-established doctrines, and has sprung from them in an ordered and scientific development. Of the American Protest which criticises it, speaking with all due respect for the learned authors of it, it is, I venture to think, open on its destructive side to this general remark: that it enunciates old doctrines in their popular form without that full examination of the underlying principles which the grave state of the world's affairs demands. On its constructive side, however, it is interesting and worthy of careful study. Let us get at once a clear view of the position. England by this Order has aimed a very vigorous blow at the heart of her enemy, but the Government of the United States has warned her that she may not do it, not from any humanitarian considerations, but because it would react to the detriment of neutral merchants. It points out that there are some principles of international law, some documents or declarations, which stand in our way. If this be really so, then international law sets the profit of the merchant above the life of nations. The theory of the United States appears to be that the conduct of war is to be governed by the interests of commerce, even if they touch those of the belligerents. The truer theory is, I believe, that commerce, in so far as it touches the interests of the belligerents, is entirely subordinated to the exigencies of war. If the view of the United States is right, then the documents and the declarations have been heedlessly signed and made, and the power of England upon the seas has been recklessly frittered away. I have endeavoured in the first article to get into sharper relief than popular notions give to it the position in which the neutral merchant stands to a belligerent and to his own Government, and also to recall the real meaning of neutrality. The Order in Council had at that time been issued, but the American Protest had not been delivered. I intimated, however, that it seemed probable that a close examination of fundamental principles would show that the Order was abundantly justified by them. The publication of the Protest confirms me in that view. 'The rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, among them that free ships make free goods, will hardly at this day be disputed by the signatories of that solemn agreement.' Thus, and no more, the Protest. The United States is not a signatory to the Declaration, and its final clause provides that it 'is not and shall not be binding, except between those Powers who have acceded, or shall accede to it.' But let us put this technical objection on one side and, admitting the rule to be a generally accepted principle, see what it has to do with the question in dispute. The position of affairs may, therefore, be stated very clearly: only in those cases in which the property in the cargoes seized has not passed out of the vendor do the questions of contraband and blockade affect him. But where the property has passed to an enemy purchaser or his agent, then other questions arise which depend on the Declaration of Paris. The Declaration of Paris has been roundly abused by many who believe that it clipped the wings of England's sea-power, having been expressly designed thereto and weakly assented to by England. This provision--'Free ships make free goods'--covers goods consigned to an enemy Government! But looking at it merely as it affects neutral merchants, it fails lamentably as a practical doctrine, because in the attempt at conciseness its authors forgot to be explicit. As it stands it is not true. It has not interfered with the right of search because contraband of war is excepted, and the fundamental argument that you cannot seize if you cannot search, 'whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be their destination,' still holds good. Nor has it interfered with or curtailed the rights incident to blockade; then the doctrine of the Declaration vanishes, for there are no 'free ships' by which the enemy's goods may be made free, all goods on board being liable to seizure. But the great defect of the provision is that it leaves deplorably vague the question by whom the 'freedom' of the enemy goods may be raised: by the neutral carrier or the enemy owner; and it is precisely this point which seems to have been ignored in the American Protest. But 'quick returns make rich merchants,' whether they result from small profits or large. And in war-time the neutral merchant, being a mere man of commerce, appears to be quite ready to 'pay for the boundless gain' which the sale of munitions gives him by taking the 'boundless risk' of seizure and condemnation, keeping the property in his cargoes while they are on the high seas. Should disaster follow, there is always 'the Government' to fall back on; and if only it can be persuaded to wave the banner of 'neutral rights' with sufficient dexterity, the chances are in favour of compensation. Now, if all neutral merchants would take Reason for their guide the Declaration of Paris would reveal hitherto unsuspected virtues. Let me commend the following brief articles to the consideration of the diplomatic professors at the next Hague Conference: First--'For the future avoidance of tortuous discussions so common in the past, the law of contraband, and so much of the law of blockade as affects neutral merchants, are hereby abolished, and all contracts for the sale of all goods whatsoever made between neutral and belligerent merchants shall for all purposes be deemed to be contracts f.o.b.' Secondly--'For the greater peace of the world, and the prevention of those financial difficulties hitherto so commonly resulting to private individuals from war, it is agreed that "free ships make free goods"; so only that such free ships, whatever be their cargoes, whatever be their destination, may be taken by either belligerent, without undue show of force or unnecessary use of explosives, into his nearest port, there to abide the decision of a Prize Court whether they be goods designed for the use of the enemy forces; and, if it be shown to the satisfaction of the Court that they be not so designed, then they shall be declared to be "free goods," and if the person entitled thereto be a neutral they shall be delivered up to him on such conditions as the Court shall think just; but if he be an enemy, other than the enemy Government, then they shall be held until the conclusion of peace, when they shall be delivered up.' Is this a scheme straight from the Councils of Utopia? I wonder! Perhaps for the present it may be left with the judicial formula 'I should like to hear the point argued.' But this is certain, that if contracts with belligerents were made with the same business caution as contracts in peace-time, all the clamour about the 'rights of neutral merchants' would die down, for they would have none which need protection, and Notes of friendly remonstrance and dexterously worded Protests would be unnecessary. But we live in an age of great unreason; and the law of contraband and all that part of the law of blockade which affects neutral merchants have been the inevitable result. The Declaration of Paris might have got rid of many difficulties with a little more study of actual facts, but it has not; and so, in spite of good intention, we must wrestle, and I propose now to wrestle, with the problems it has left unsolved. The learned student detects here what appears to be an obvious flaw in the argument. He has been taught that 'a blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy,' and that 'the blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts.' The first and eighteenth articles of the Declaration of London have thus summarised the practice. The Government of the United States has not forgotten those elementary maxims; but it will not let them interfere with the development of its theory of the 'long-distance blockade.' The principle on which they are based can well be preserved: 'If the necessities of the case should seem to render it imperative that the cordon of blockading vessels be extended across the approaches to any neighbouring neutral port or country, it would seem clear that it would still be practicable to comply with the well-recognised and reasonable prohibition of international law against the blockading of neutral ports by according free admission and exit to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the blockading cordon.' Very frankly, I have my doubts as to the soundness of the American contention. When this time of warfare is overpast and only its echoes remain, when another Conference shall assemble at the Hague to endeavour to read its lessons more surely than its predecessors had learnt those of previous wars, I doubt whether this new doctrine of blockade will find much favour; for if it is accepted as an 'effective blockade' the artificial side of the law must also be accepted, and a temporary withdrawal on account of stress of weather must be declared not to raise it. But of this I have no doubt, that the principle on which blockade rests will always be recognised, must always be recognised because it is a fact--that a belligerent will, and therefore, as we are used to say, 'may,' resort to the final strangling process whenever he has the power, because he has the power; of this no arbitrary rules can deprive him. I believe that when things come to be weighed in the balance, when Time's just sentence is pronounced, it will be that the new Order in Council indicates the proper method by which a belligerent may, in view of the advance in the methods of naval warfare, now exercise that strenuous and strangling pressure upon the enemy which in old days he was entitled to do by means of a technical blockade, and that in the way it deals with the neutral merchant it has found the correct solution of that part of the problem. A great point is also made by the United States Government that the Order in Council is invalid because, if it is to be considered as a blockade, it discriminates against the United States and is not enforced against those countries which, owing to their contiguity to Germany, are inside the cruiser cordon. The principle on which this complaint is based is thus given in Article 5 of the Declaration of London:--'A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations.' This principle is an integral part of the old system of blockade, under which access to neutral ports or coasts may not be barred by the blockading forces . But it is manifest that directly the principle of the 'long-distance blockade' is admitted the access to neutral ports must be interfered with; and the Protest expressly recognises the necessity of admitting this principle. Moreover, it would seem that Article 5 of the Declaration applies to an intentional discrimination between the ships of different countries by the blockading belligerent. It is clear that the United States Government does not interpret the article to be, from reasons of geography, an impediment to the new form of blockade which it has expressly approved. Blockade in principle is, therefore, nothing more than an indefinite extension of the list of contraband of war, subject only to the requirement that a sufficient number of ships should be placed in such a position as to make this extended threat of seizure effective. This then is practically what the Order in Council does; and even if it insisted on condemnation in all cases it would be justified, for it satisfies the test which this analysis shows to be the true test, and the only test, that the ships employed upon the service, both as regards number and position, shall be effective for its due performance. What is true of the deep sea must also be true of the high air. When the lorries and cargo-carriers of the air have come into being, and the war in the air becomes even more of a grim reality than it is to-day, neutrals carrying supplies to the enemy will, I imagine, receive short shrift, contraband or no contraband, siege or no siege, blockade or no blockade. But the United States Government rests its protest on an alternative ground. The Order in Council, it declares, would constitute, were its provisions to be actually carried into effect as they stand, a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace. This Government takes it for granted that there can be no question what those rights are. A nation's sovereignty over its own ships and citizens under its own flag on the high seas in time of peace is, of course, unlimited. And that sovereignty suffers no diminution in times of war except in so far as the practice and consent of civilised nations have limited it by the recognition of certain now clearly determined rights which it is conceded may be exercised by nations which are at war. A belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit and search, and the right of capture and condemnation if upon examination a neutral vessel is found to be engaged in unneutral service or to be carrying contraband of war intended for the enemy's Government or armed forces. It has been conceded the right to establish and maintain a blockade of an enemy's ports and coasts, and to capture and condemn any vessel taken in trying to break the blockade. It is even conceded the right to detain and take to its own ports for judicial examination all vessels which it suspects for substantial reasons to be engaged in unneutral service, and to condemn them if the suspicion is sustained. But such rights, long clearly defined both in doctrine and practice, have hitherto been held to be the only permissible exceptions to the principle of equality of sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and nations not engaged in war. If the rights of the neutral merchant are no greater than I have stated them in the first article, and he acts at his own peril and is entirely independent of his own Government, and if the rights of the belligerents are as large as I have there stated them, then it follows that there can be no question of 'concession' by the neutral merchant's Government, in regard to either contraband or blockade, but only an assertion of belligerent right, and all questions as to the sovereignty of that Government over its merchants' ships disappear. When the neutral merchant is carrying contraband, or when he is blockade-running, he deliberately runs his risk, and therefore cannot claim the protection of his flag. Further, the laws of the United States , 'do not forbid their citizens to sell to either of the belligerent Powers articles contraband of war, or to take munitions of war ... on board their private ships for transportation.' It is impossible, therefore, to say that the neutral Government--except only when an embargo has been declared--exercises jurisdiction over such private ships, for the national law creates no offence which could give jurisdiction. Therefore it is clear that the neutral vessel by carrying contraband or running blockade puts herself deliberately, and with the acquiescence of her own Government, at the mercy of the other belligerent, and submits to the exercise of belligerent rights. But although I have been obliged to devote great space to these preliminary subjects, the point of the Protest is still to come. The condition attached by the United States to its theory of the 'long-distance blockade' is that free admission and exit must be accorded 'to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the blockading cordon.' 'Lawful traffic,' it is explained, 'would of course include all outward-bound traffic from the neutral country, and all inward-bound traffic to the neutral country except contraband in transit to the enemy.' This must be read with a sentence which occurs earlier in the Protest:-- At last we have the real issue. Assume everything in our favour: that our blockading cruisers are rightly standing far out to sea; that we should be justified in condemning the cargoes seized instead of returning them to the persons lawfully entitled thereto: the United States denies that its own particular doctrine of 'continuous voyages' can apply to a 'long-distance blockade.' And here undoubtedly the books seem to be in its favour, for the rule they give, embodied in Article 19 of the Declaration of London, is shortly this: the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' does not apply to a blockade. This is the logical consequence of the principle to which I have already referred; that the blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports, because the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' expressly deals with cargoes on vessels bound for neutral ports. But it would seem to follow that with the disappearance of the offing from the definition of 'blockade,' and the consequent legitimate interference with access to neutral ports, the application of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' must follow as a matter of course. The fact is that the United States Government has not fully counted the cost of its own admission. As I have already shown, once the theory of the 'long-distance blockade' is admitted the principle of non-discrimination, a legal nicety appurtenant to the old blockade, goes by the board, because geography compels an involuntary discrimination against neutral countries which are outside the cordon; so it is clear that this other principle of non-application of the doctrine of 'continuous voyages' to blockade must also go by the board, because it is the result of principles specially applicable to the old blockade. The doctrine of 'continuous voyages' holds no precious mystery; it never meant more than this: that what the neutral trader cannot do directly without running the risk of seizure and condemnation he cannot do indirectly without running that risk. And whereas, as has been shown, the right to blockade the enemy is in principle no more than the right indefinitely to extend the list of contraband of war against the neutral trader, this must apply equally whether cargoes are going directly or indirectly to the enemy. There has been much talk of retaliation. The Order in Council has adopted the formula of the first of the Orders in Council of 1807, that the action of the enemy has given to His Majesty the 'unquestionable right of retaliation,' and it has been assumed, too readily as I venture to think, that this is an admission that our action to-day falls outside the principles sanctioned by international law. The American newspapers have found apt expression of their criticism in the ancient adage 'Two wrongs do not make a right.' And in the Protest of the Government this sentence occurs: If the course pursued by the present enemies of Great Britain should prove to be in fact tainted by illegality and disregard of the principles of war sanctioned by enlightened nations, it cannot be supposed, and the Government does not for a moment suppose, that His Majesty's Government would wish the same taint to attach to their own actions, or would cite such illegal acts as in any sense or degree a justification for similar practices on their part in so far as they affect neutral rights. A comparison of the measures taken by the Order in Council with those ordered by the German Admiralty can hardly have been seriously intended; yet to many this sentence seemed to be straining diplomatic proprieties to their utmost limit. But any irritation it may have caused has been blotted out by the stern words of disapproval used by the President in his recent Notes to Germany. But the reference to retaliation cannot, as it seems to me, be legitimately construed into an admission of the illegality of the measures decreed by the Order in Council. The utmost that can be said of it is that it admits they are exceptional. The Order of 1807 declared that 'no vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, both French,' and it was enforced by seizure and confiscation of neutral vessels which disregarded it. That and the other Orders which countered Napoleon's paper blockade of the English coasts have been severely criticised; but it is impossible to apply the same criticism to an Order which omits the confiscation, and on the contrary, expressly provides for the return of both ship and cargo to the neutral merchant. That the measures are exceptional may be freely admitted, and to that extent they may be called reprisals; but exceptional measures, even of reprisal, are not necessarily illegal measures. If we should once admit the right of the Allies to forbid our sending foodstuffs to Germany, how could we deny the justice of Germany's insistence that we should apply the same principle to England? And what would happen to the English people then? Surely, too, our British friends must realise that only the strictest adherence to international law makes it possible for us to furnish to the Allies the vast quantities of war munitions without which they could not hope to win. The great friendliness of its tone cannot but be grateful to us; yet in this short sentence all the fallacies and misconceptions of the real nature of the neutral merchant's position are concentrated. I have endeavoured to show that we have claimed to exercise a right which a fuller examination of admitted principles shows to be entirely warranted, that the only thing which stands in the way of the prompt admission of its legality is a popular conception of belligerent rights which unduly confines them within limits which have proved themselves to be impossible in modern conditions of war. Law once was the handmaid of commerce: she has long since become its mistress. But what, for want of a better name we call international law is still in a state of servitude. If its doctrines are to be treated as intelligible they must be considered as a continuous development springing from, and as the inevitable consequence of, the first cause, that two nations are at war. Then War becomes the key-note, subdominant, dominant, leading note, every note of the scale of action throughout the world, and the neutral merchant cannot pitch the tune as it may best suit his interests. Is then the justification for the new procedure of the Order in Council an ultimate reference to Might is Right? Have I, following far behind the United States Government in the strenuousness of the law as I have formulated it, found also a justification for the German who relies on Might without troubling to assert the Right? Surely not. I have striven to base the whole law and every part of the law as it affects the neutral merchant on the plain fact that all exercise of might against the enemy, so long as it comes within the laws of humanity and the rules of war, is justifiable, and the omission of it mere folly, and that it is not limited by considerations of time and space; and on this still plainer fact that the exercise of might against the enemy engenders 'right' against such neutral merchants as do, of their own free will and with eyes open, bring themselves within the scope of it. Add to tbrJar First Page Next Page Prev Page |
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