Read Ebook: History for ready reference Volume 5 Tunnage to Zyp and Supplement by Larned J N Josephus Nelson Reiley Alan C Alan Campbell Contributor

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . The seat of the rebel government transferred to Richmond.

See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 .

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . On to Richmond. The First Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas.

"The Southern Government having inclined to the defensive policy as that upon which they should act, their first object was to prevent an advance of any Federal force into Virginia. Early in the month of May troops were assembled in Richmond, and pushed forward toward the northeastern boundary of the State, to a position known as Manassas Junction. ... It is here that a railroad from Alexandria, another from Staunton up the valley and through Manassas Gap, and another from Gordonsville unite. At Gordonsville the railroad from Richmond and the line from East Tennessee unite. As a point for concentration none more eligible exists in northeastern Virginia. The advantages for fortification are naturally such that the place can be rendered impregnable. Here the centre of the northern force of the Southern army was posted, with the left wing pushed forward to Winchester and the right extended to the Potomac, and sustained by heavy batteries which served to blockade the river. The Federal force, the advance of which was assembled at Washington for the defence of that city against any attack by the Southern troops, was posted on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on Arlington Heights, which were strongly fortified. Their right was pushed some distance up the Potomac, and chiefly on the Maryland side, while their left occupied Alexandria. The armies of both sides consisted of raw militia hastily brought together, and of volunteers who for the first time had put on the uniform, and taken up the weapons of the soldier. On both sides the forces were constantly accumulating. On the morning of June 27th, the consolidated report of General Mansfield, commanding the Department of Washington, gives the number of troops in that city and vicinity. The privates, including regulars and volunteers present for duty, numbered 22,846 men. The grand aggregate of the force, including officers, etc., present and absent, was 34,160 men. The force of General Patterson, commanding in Maryland above Washington, and also on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on the 28th of June, was returned, embracing officers and men enlisted and present for duty, 15,923. Of these about 550 were reported as sick."

"The return of Johnston's army for June 30th showed his total force present for duty to have been 10,654; but this includes some troops which, though assigned to his army, did not join him till after July 3d. ... A prime object of Johnston in taking post at Winchester was, that he might be enabled to join the army at Manassas in case of need. On June 2d, only a week after Johnston's arrival at Harper's Ferry, Beauregard had reached Manassas and assumed command. He and Johnston at once communicated with each other, and agreed in their views of the importance of mutual support. ... As soon as Johnston ascertained ... that McClellan was not moving on Romney and Winchester, the feasibility of this movement to Manassas at the right time became greater. The only problem then remaining was to so time it as to arrive just long enough before the impending battle to take part in it, and not so long as to cause, by the news of his arrival, a corresponding transfer of Patterson. ... It was for the purpose of gaining as much start as possible on Patterson that Johnston had retired to Winchester, instead of remaining opposite the Northern force at Martinsburg. He kept his cavalry well out, in order to be informed as promptly as possible of the slightest change in Patterson's position. Meanwhile the grand Federal advance upon Manassas had commenced."

Says General McDowell, in his subsequent report of the movement and the disastrous battle: "When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July . Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my ever seeing them and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending re-enforcements to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 10th ultimo. When I did set out on the 10th I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go in to action on the 19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only come from Vienna, about 6 miles, and it was not more than 6 1/2 miles farther to Centreville, in all a march of 12 1/2 miles; but the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the load of 'light marching order.'"

The advance of the Union Army was made "in five divisions, commanded by Generals Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, Runyon, and Miles. Among the brigade commanders that afterward rose to eminence were William T. Sherman, Ambrose E. Burnside, Erastus D. Keyes, and Oliver O. Howard. The total force was somewhat over 34,000 men; but Runyon's division was left to guard the line of communication with Washington, and the number that actually moved against the enemy was about 28,000 with 49 guns and a battalion of cavalry. So little did strict military discipline as yet enter into the policy of the Government that a large number of civilians, including several members of Congress, obtained passes enabling them to ride out in carriages, close in the rear of the army, to witness the expected battle. ... The troops marched by the Warrenton turnpike, and found themselves in the presence of the enemy on the banks of Bull Run on the 18th. ... The enemy's outposts had fallen back as the army advanced, and the first serious opposition was met at Blackburn's Ford," where some sharp fighting occurred between Tyler's division and the Confederate troops under Longstreet. "McDowell, finding that Beauregard was very strongly intrenched on his right, and that the roads in that direction were not good, changed his plan and determined to attack on the north or left wing. Another reason for doing this lay in the fact that McDowell had distrusted Patterson from the first, having no faith that he would hold Johnston. ... The action at Blackburn's Ford had been fought on Thursday. Friday and Saturday were consumed in reconnoissances and searching for a suitable ford on the upper part of the stream, where a column could cross and, marching down on the right bank, uncover the fords held by the enemy and enable the remainder of the army to cross. Such a ford was found at length, and on Sunday morning, the 21st, the army was put in motion. McDowell did not know that Johnston had easily eluded Patterson and with two fifths of his forces joined Beauregard on Saturday. ... The Confederate commanders had actually ordered a forward movement of their own right wing; but as they saw the development of McDowell's plan they recalled that, and gradually strengthened their left to meet the onset. ... The battleground was a plateau, wooded and broken."

In the Report of the Confederate General Beauregard, the plateau which now became the principal battle ground of the conflict is described as follows: "It is inclosed on three sides by small water-courses, which empty into Bull Run within a few yards of each other a half a mile to the south of the stone bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite 100 feet above the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three sides to the level of the enclosing streams in gentle slopes, but which are furrowed by ravines of irregular direction and length, and studded with clumps and patches of young pines and oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is oblique to the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the Brentsville and turnpike roads, which intersect each other at right angles. Immediately surrounding the two houses ... are small open fields of irregular outline, not exceeding 150 acres in extent. The houses, occupied at the time, the one by the Widow Henry and the other by the free negro Robinson, are small wooden buildings, the latter densely embowered in trees and environed by a double row of fences on two sides. Around the eastern and southern brow of the plateau an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth pines gave excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of it with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining the fields, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across the crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which during the battle regiments of both armies met and contended for the mastery. From the open ground of this plateau the view embraces a wide expanse of woods and gently undulating open country of broad grass and grain fields in all directions."

At an early hour in the afternoon, the Union forces had driven the enemy from this plateau and seemed to be in a position which promised victory to them. Says General McDowell in his official report: "The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been fighting since 10.30 o'clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was not more that 9 1/2 miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before, many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks. It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid from the railroad train . They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic. Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization and force. They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost."

"The battle of Bull Run was a misfortune, and not a disgrace, to the Federal arms; but the reports of losses on both sides prove that it was bravely disputed. ... The rout--or, in other words, the panic-- ... was one of those accidents to which even victorious armies are sometimes liable, and against which old troops are not always able to guard. The importance of the battle of Bull Run cannot be measured by the amount of losses sustained by the two contending parties. ... Its immediate effect upon military operations was to produce a sudden change in the attitude of the belligerents. The possession of Virginia, with the exception of that portion which had been recaptured by McClellan, was secured to the Confederates. Richmond was beyond danger of any attack, and Washington was threatened anew. ... But it was chiefly through its moral effect that this first encounter was to exercise a powerful influence upon the war of which it was only the prelude. The South saw in this victory a kind of ratification of her claims. It was not only the Federal soldiers who were vanquished on that day, but with them all who had remained more or less openly loyal to the Union in the Southern States. ... This disaster, which might have discouraged the North, proved, on the contrary, a salutary lesson."

"Those only can realize the condition of our Army, at that time, who can recall the incidents of this memorable campaign and the battle with which it closed. The crowds of curious and impertinent spectators who accompanied and often rode through our ranks; the long and fatal delay of Hunter's column, on the morning of the battle--a delay occasioned by a few baggage-waggons, which should have been miles in rear--the many ludicrous, yet sad, scenes on the field; the heroic, but fruitless, gallantry of separate regiments, each attempting, in detail, the accomplishment of a work which required the combined effort of all; the dread, on the part of our men, of those terrible 'masked batteries' and 'the fierce Black-horse Cavalry,' neither of which ever had an existence except in the imaginative brains of our newspaper reporters, all help to fill up the picture. ... I believe the plan of this battle to have been well-conceived, notwithstanding its disastrous result. We were compelled to take the offensive against troops in position, and upon a field, the topography of which was unknown to nearly all our officers. Notwithstanding these facts, successes would have been achieved but for the impatient spirit which hurried us on, without the slightest preparation. Of the march, the battle, the rout, and the disorderly retreat to Washington, the description given by William H. Russell was not greatly exaggerated. It was far more truthful than many of the descriptions given by the reporters of our own papers. Who has forgotten the newspaper accounts of the conduct of the celebrated Fire Zouaves--of the prodigies of valor performed by them--of their bayonet charges--of their heroic assaults--of the fearful destruction inflicted by them upon the enemy--and, finally, when the order to retreat came, of the great difficulty experienced by the officers in forcing 'these gallant, but bloodthirsty lambs,' as they were called, to cease fighting and commence retreating? We all remember these accounts, and many others of a similar character; and yet, every intelligent officer who was on the field knows that this regiment dispersed at the first fire, and so thoroughly was it dispersed that it was from that day never again known as a military organization. This campaign, and every subsequent one, of the War, taught us that the rough element of our cities--the prize-fighter, the veteran of a score of street-fights--does not necessarily make the most valuable soldier. On the contrary, many a pale-faced boy, who, from a sense of duty, has left school or counting-room to join our Army, has exhibited a degree of endurance on the march and of bravery on the field, seldom equalled by the rough element of our cities."

"The failure of the Confederate army to pursue after the battle of Manassas has been much criticised, and has caused much acrimonious discussion. General Johnston, however, never hesitated to assume his share of the responsibility for the action taken, though insisting that the course pursued was proper, and the only practicable one under the circumstances. ... The troops who had been actually engaged all day, in the hot summer season, were in no condition to follow up the enemy. But the great obstacle to any effective pursuit was the weakness of the cavalry arm in the Southern army. Its entire strength was considerably under 2,000 men, and a large proportion of these were not in call. Many of those within reach had been fighting for hours, and were in little better condition than the infantry. All who were available were sent off in immediate pursuit, with the result of greatly swelling the number of prisoners and captured guns. But by the time the captors turned their prizes over to proper guards, the Northern army had covered a sufficient distance to be out of danger, being protected in their retreat by large bodies of troops that had not been engaged. This was all that could be accomplished. ... The fact that the condition of the Confederate troops put any active pursuit out of the question is established by the official reports. General Johnston's report says: 'Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be.' ... The same reasons apply with equal force to any attempted advance during the few days succeeding the battle. The army was not in a condition to make the movement, being itself much demoralized by the engagement. Many thought the war over and went home; many accompanied wounded comrades to their homes; for the ties of discipline were not as strong then as in a veteran army. But a yet stronger obstacle to an advance was the lack of necessary transportation. ... Even if the Confederates had advanced and captured the intrenchments opposite Washington, they could have accomplished nothing. They could not have crossed the river on the bridge under the fire of the Federal vessels of war. They had no artillery of sufficient range to bombard Washington from the southern side, even if they had been disposed to wage war in that manner. They had no sufficient supply of ammunition."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . Enlistment of volunteers authorized by Congress.

The enlistment of 500,000 volunteers was authorized by Acts of Congress passed July 22 and 25.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . Sigel's well-conducted retreat from Carthage. Death of Lyon at Wilson's Creek. Siege of Lexington. Fremont in command.

The flight of Governor Jackson and his followers from Booneville was westward, to Warsaw, on the Osage, first, and thence into Vernon County, where they were joined, July 3, by General Sterling Price.

See MISSOURI: A. D. 1861 .

"Their united force is stated by Pollard, at 3,600. Being pursued by Lyon, they continued their retreat next day, halting at 9 P. M., in Jasper County, 23 miles distant. Ten miles hence, at 10 A. M. next morning, they were confronted by a Union force 1,500 strong, under Colonel Franz Sigel, who had been dispatched from St. Louis by the 'Southwestern Pacific road, to Rolla, had marched thence to Springfield, and had pushed on to Mount Vernon, Lawrence County, hoping to prevent a junction between Jackson and some forces which his Brigadiers were hurrying to his support. Each army appears to have started that morning with intent to find and fight the other; and such mutual intentions are seldom frustrated. Sigel found the Rebels, halted after their morning march, well posted, vastly superior in numbers and in cavalry, but inferior in artillery, which he accordingly resolved should play a principal part in the battle. In the cannonade which ensued, he inflicted great damage on the Rebels and received very little, until, after a desultory combat of three or four hours, the enemy resolved to profit by their vast superiority in cavalry by outflanking him, both right and left. This compelled Sigel to fall back. ... The retreat was made in perfect order ... to Carthage, and through that town to Sarcoxie, some fifteen miles eastward. It was well, indeed, that he did so; for Jackson's force was augmented, during that night and next morning, by the arrival of Price from the southward, bringing to his aid several thousand Arkansas and Texas troops, under Generals Ben McCulloch and Pearce. Our loss in the affair of Carthage was 13 killed and 31 wounded--not one of them abandoned to the enemy; while the Rebels reported their loss at 40 to 50 killed and 125 to 150 wounded. Sigel, now outnumbered three or four to one, was constrained to continue his retreat, by Mount Vernon, to Springfield; where General Lyon, who had been delayed by lack of transportation, joined and outranked him on the 10th."

"The month of August came, and found General Lyon at Springfield, hoping to receive reenforcements; but the battle of Bull Run had occurred, and rendered it impossible to send him aid. Major General Fremont had been appointed to the command of the Western Department, and had reached St. Louis . Meantime Confederate troops were pouring over the southern frontier of Missouri, and Lyon, finding that they were advancing upon him in two columns, determined to strike before he should be overwhelmed by the combined Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas troops. His force did not exceed 5,500, his antagonist had more than 12,000. A skirmish occurred at Dug Spring , in which he had the advantage; but he could not prevent the junction of the two columns. Hereupon he fell back to Springfield. His position had now become one of great difficulty. Political as well as military considerations rendered it almost impossible for him to retreat farther. He therefore determined to resume the offensive, and compensate for his weakness by audacity. Moving out of Springfield on a very dark night , and having ordered Sigel, with 1,200 men and six guns, to gain the enemy's rear by their right, he was ready, as soon as day broke, to make an attack on their front . But the disparity of force was too great. Sigel was overwhelmed. He lost five out of his six guns, and more than half his men. The attack in front was conducted by Lyon in person with very great energy. His horse was shot under him; he was twice wounded, the second time in the head. In a final charge he called to the Second Kansas Regiment, whose colonel was at that moment severely wounded, 'Come on, I will lead you,' and in so doing was shot through the heart. After the death of Lyon the battle was still continued, their artillery preserving the national troops from total defeat. News then coming of Sigel's disaster, a retreat to Springfield, distant about nine miles, was resolved on. It was executed without difficulty. In this battle of Wilson's Creek there were 223 killed, 721 wounded, 292 missing, on the national side; and, as may be inferred from the determined character of the assault, the loss of the Confederates was very great. They had been so severely handled that they made no attempt at pursuit, and the retreat was continued by the national troops, who, on the 19th, had fallen back to Rolla. After this action, the Confederate commanders, McCulloch and Price, quarreling with each other, and unable to agree upon a plan for their campaign, the former returned to Arkansas, the latter advanced from Springfield toward Lexington. Here he found a national force of about three thousand under Colonel Mulligan. Attempts were made by General Fremont to re-enforce Mulligan, but they did not succeed. Meantime the assailing forces were steadily increasing in number, until they eventually reached 28,000, with 13 pieces of artillery. They surrounded the position and cut off the beleaguered troops from water. They made repeated assaults without success until 20th, when they contrived a movable breastwork of hemp-bales, which they rolled before them as they advanced, and compelled Mulligan, who had been twice wounded, to surrender unconditionally. On receiving news of this disaster, Fremont at once left St. Louis with the intention of attacking Price, but that general instantly retreated, making his way back to the southwest corner of the state, where he rejoined McCulloch and his Confederate troops."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . McClellan's rise to the chief command. Creation of the Army of the Potomac. Reorganization of the western armies.

"Immediately after the battle of Bull Run, Major General McClellan was assigned to the command of the Military Department of Washington and Northeastern Virginia. Lieutenant General Scott retained his command as general in chief of the American army, until the end of October. 'I found,' says General McClellan in his report, 'no army to command--a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field batteries of 30 pieces.' ... General McClellan at once commenced the organization of the great army authorized by Congress. His views of the military position and appropriate military conduct were, for the most part, accepted, and such was the patriotism of the people, the resolution of Congress, the energy of the executive, that the Army of the Potomac had reached, on October 27th, a strength of ... 168,318. It was the general's opinion that the advance upon the enemy at Manassas should not be postponed beyond the 25th of November. It was his desire that all the other armies should be stripped of their superfluous strength, and, as far as possible, every thing concentrated in the force under his command. On the 31st of October, General Scott, having found his bodily infirmities increasing, addressed a letter to the Secretary of War requesting to be placed on the retired list. ... His desire was granted. An order was simultaneously issued appointing General McClellan commander-in-chief under the President. This change in his position at once produced a change in General McClellan's views. Hitherto he had undervalued the importance of what was to be done in the West. He had desired the Western armies to act on the defensive. Now he wished to institute an advance on East Tennessee, and capture Nashville contemporaneously with Richmond. ... In preparation for this, the Department of the West was reorganized. On the day following that of McClellan's promotion, Fremont was removed from his command. His department was subdivided into three: New Mexico, which was assigned to Colonel Canby; Kansas, to General Hunter; Missouri, to General Halleck. To General Buell was assigned the Department of the Ohio, and to General Rosecrans that of West Virginia. The end of November approached, and still the Army of the Potomac had not moved. The weather was magnificent, the roads excellent. ... Winter at last came, and nothing had been done. ... Considering the military condition of the nation when General McClellan undertook the formation and organization of the great Army of the Potomac, the time consumed in bringing that force into a satisfactory condition was far from being too long. ... From the resources furnished without stint by Congress McClellan created that army. Events showed that his mental constitution was such that he could not use it on the battlefield. ... There probably never was an army in the world so lavishly supplied as that of the Potomac before the Peninsular expedition. General McDowell, who knew the state of things well, declared, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, 'There never was an army in the world supplied as well as ours. I believe a French army of half the size could be supplied with what we waste.'"

"Some persons, who ought to have known better, have supposed that in organizing the Army of the Potomac I set too high a model before me and consumed unnecessary time in striving to form an army of regulars. This was an unjustifiable error on their part. I should, of course, have been glad to bring that army to the condition of regulars, but no one knew better than myself that, with the means at my command, that would have been impossible within any reasonable or permissible time. What I strove for and accomplished was to bring about such a condition of discipline and instruction that the army could be handled on the march and on the field of battle, and that orders could be reasonably well carried out. ... In spite of all the clamor to the contrary, the time spent in the camps of instruction in front of Washington was well bestowed, and produced the most important and valuable results. Not a day of it was wasted. The fortifications then erected, both directly and indirectly, saved the capital more than once in the course of the war, and enabled the army to manoeuvre freely and independently. ... No other army we possessed could have met and defeated the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. And, with all the courage, energy, and intelligence of the Army of the Potomac, it probably would not have been equal to that most difficult task without the advantage it enjoyed during its sojourn in the camps around Washington."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . Act of Congress freeing Slaves employed in the service of the Rebellion.

In August, Congress passed an "Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes." As originally framed, it only confiscated "any property used or employed in aiding, abetting or promoting insurrection, or resistance to the laws," which would not include slaves. A new section was added, declaring that "whenever hereafter during the present insurrection against the Government of the United States, any person held to labor or service under the law of any State shall be required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or service is due to take up arms against the United States, or to work in or upon any fort, dock, navy-yard, armory, intrenchment or in any military or naval service whatever against the Government of the United States, the person to whom such service or labor is due shall forfeit his claim thereto." The law further provided that, "whenever any person shall seek to enforce his claim to a slave, it shall be a sufficient answer to such claim, that the slave had been employed in the military or naval service against the United States contrary to the provisions of this Act."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . The Hatteras expedition.

"General Wool relieved General Butler August 16th, 1861, of the command at Fortress Monroe. Butler was detailed to active duty. The War and Navy Departments having arranged the first of a series of expeditions against the Southern coast, the command of the land forces was conferred upon Butler--Commodore S. H. Stringham directing the naval arm. Materials for the adventure were rapidly gathered at Fortress Monroe from the date of August 16th to the 26th, on which day the fleet took its departure. ... Not until the vessels were at sea were any but the directors of the enterprize aware of the point of attack. Forts Hatteras and Clark commanded the entrance to the Sounds of Pamlico and Albemarle, whose waters were a great rendezvous for traders running the blockade. ... Fort Hatteras was an exceedingly formidable battery. It was nearly surrounded by water, and was only approached by a circuitous and narrow neck of land. ... The secrecy and rapidity of preparation by the Federals caught the rebels somewhat unprepared for the attack. ... The bombardment opened Wednesday morning, at ten o'clock, preparatory to the landing of the land forces on the beach above Fort Hatteras. ... A heavy surf rolled in upon the treacherous sands. After infinite labor, and the beaching of three small boats, the landing was suspended for the day. Those already on shore--315 in number--were safe under the guns of the fleet. ... The bombardment continued during the entire first day. No land assault was attempted. Fort Hatteras replied with great vigor, but with little avail. ... On the morning of the 29th, the cannonade opened early. A cloudless sky and a clear sea blessed the cause of the assailants. During the night a transport heavily laden with troops reenforced the fort, running down the Sound which was yet open. Fort Clark was occupied by the Federal forces, and refused its aid to assist its late confederate. The conflict soon raged with extreme vigor on both sides. At eleven o'clock the Confederate flag fluttered uneasily a moment--then ran down the halyards and a white flag was slowly run to the peak. ... Articles of capitulation were signed on board the flag-ship Minnesota. Butler then landed and took formal possession of the largest fortification. The number of prisoners surrendered was 615, who were all placed on the Minnesota. In four days time they were in New York harbor. ... The first design, it would appear, was to destroy the forts, stop up the channel with old hulks, and to return, temporarily at least, to Fortress Monroe with the entire force; but the place proved to be so strong that Butler left Weber and Hawkins' commands in possession."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . Fremont's premature proclamation of freedom to slaves of rebels and Lincoln's modification of it. The change of command.

"On the 31st of August, General Fremont issued a proclamation declaring martial law, defining the lines of the army of occupation, and threatening with death by the bullet all who should be found within those lines with arms in their hands. Furthermore, the real and personal property of all persons in the state who should take up arms against the United States was declared confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if they had any, were declared free men. This proclamation produced a strong effect upon the public mind. The proclaiming of freedom to the slaves of rebels struck the popular chord, particularly among thoroughly loyal men in the free states. Of course, it maddened all the sympathizers with the rebellion, infuriated the rebels themselves, and perplexed those loyal men who had upon their hands the task of so conducting affairs as to hold to their allegiance the border slave states which had not seceded. Mr. Lincoln did not approve some features of General Fremont's proclamation. As soon as he read it, he wrote, under date of September 2d, to the General, that there were two points in it which gave him anxiety. The first was, that, if he should shoot a man according to his proclamation, 'the confederates would certainly shoot our best men in their hands in retaliation, and so, man for man, indefinitely.' He therefore ordered him to allow no man to be shot under the proclamation without first having his approbation or consent. The second cause of anxiety was that the paragraph relating to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves of traitorous owners would alarm Unionists at the South, and perhaps ruin the fair prospect of saving Kentucky to the Union. He, therefore, wished General Fremont, as of his own motion, so to modify his proclamation as to make it conformable to the confiscation act just passed by the extra session of Congress, which only freed such slaves as were engaged in the rebel service. ... General Fremont received the President's letter respectfully, and replied to it September 8th, stating the difficulties under which he labored, with communication with the government so difficult, and the development of perplexing events so rapid in the department under his command. As to the part of his proclamation concerning the slaves, he wished the President openly to order the change desired, as, if he should do it of his own motion, it would imply that he thought himself wrong, and that he had acted without the reflection which the gravity of the point demanded. This the President did, in a dispatch under date of September 11th, in the words: 'It is therefore ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so modified, held, and constructed, as to conform to, and not to transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the act of Congress entitled, An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes, approved August 6, 1861; and that such act be published at length with this order.' Before this order had been received, or on the day following its date, General Fremont, though acquainted with the President's wishes, manumitted two slaves of Thomas L. Snead of St. Louis, in accordance with the terms of his proclamation. Although Mr. Lincoln desired General Fremont so to modify his proclamation as to make it accordant with the act of Congress approved August 6th, it is hardly to be supposed that he did it solely out of respect to that act. ... If he had believed that the time had come for the measure of liberating the slaves of rebels by proclamation, the act of Congress would not have stood in his way. This act was an embodiment of his policy at that time, and he used it for his immediate purpose. ... Complications in the personal relations of General Fremont and Colonel F. P. Blair, under whose personal and family influence General Fremont had received his position, occurred at an early day. Colonel Blair doubtless thought that he had not sufficient weight in the General's counsels, and the General, doubtless, exercised his right in choosing his own counselors. ... It was a very unhappy quarrel, and it is quite likely that there was blame upon both sides, though it occurred between men equally devoted to the sacred cause of saving the country to freedom and justice. ... Mr. Lincoln always gave to each the credit due to his motives, and so far refused to mingle in the general quarrel that grew out of the difficulty, that he kept the good-will of both sides, and compelled them to settle their own differences. ... General Fremont at length took the field in person. On the 8th of October he left Jefferson City for Sedalia. As he advanced with his forces, Price retreated, until it was widely reported that he would give battle to the national forces at Springfield. Just as Fremont was making ready to engage the enemy, he was overtaken by an order relieving him of his command. He was succeeded by General Hunter; but Hunter's command was brief, and was transferred at an early day to General Halleck. General Fremont was relieved of his command by the President not because of his proclamation, not because he hated slavery, and not because he believed him corrupt or vindictive or disloyal. He relieved him simply because he believed that the interests of the country, all things considered, would be subserved by relieving him and putting another man in his place. The matter was the cause of great excitement in Missouri, and of much complaint among the radical anti-slavery men of the country: but the imputations sought to be cast upon the President were not fastened to him; and did not, four years later, when Fremont himself became a candidate for the presidency, prevent the warmest anti-slavery men from giving Mr. Lincoln their support. The federal army under General Hunter retreated without a battle; and thus the campaign, inaugurated with great show and immense expense, was a flat failure."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . Rosecrans against Lee. Battles of Carnifex Ferry and Cheat Summit.

"When General McClellan was called to take General McDowell's place at the head of the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier-General William S. Rosecrans was left in command of the troops in West Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, the Confederate commander, who had gathered together the forces which had been defeated under Garnett and Pegram, and some others, found himself in August at the head of about 16,000 men. Lee made his headquarters at Huntersville, while General John B. Floyd ... took up a position on the Gauley River for the purpose of cutting off General Cox of Ohio, who, with a brigade of Rosecrans's army, had just driven a Confederate force under ex-Governor Henry A. Wise of Virginia out of the Kanawha Valley. Floyd surprised and routed the Seventh Ohio under Colonel Tyler, and then moved to a place on the Gauley River called Carnifex Ferry, hoping to cut off Cox from Rosecrans. But early in September Rosecrans, leaving part of his army under General Joseph J. Reynolds to watch Lee, marched southward with about 10,000 men and attacked Floyd, who had strongly fortified himself with about 2,000 men on the banks of the river. After a severe fight of three or four hours, in which the Union troops lost heavily, Rosecrans, finding the position much stronger than he expected, gave orders at twilight to stop the assault until morning; but when morning came no enemy was to be seen; Floyd, finding his enemy much superior in numbers, had crossed the river in the night over a bridge hastily built of logs, and retreated to the mountains 30 miles away. Rosecrans followed, but finally fell back again to the Gauley. When Rosecrans marched against Floyd, Reynolds took up a strong position on Cheat Mountain."

"General Lee proposed first to win a victory, if possible, over Reynolds. He was combative, anxious to strike, but many difficulties confronted him. He fully realized he had been sent to West Virginia to retrieve Confederate disasters, and that he had a most difficult task to perform. The Federal commander held the center summit of Cheat Mountain pass, the mountain having three well-defined summits. ... It was necessary first to carry this well-selected position of the Federal troops. A citizen surveyor, in sympathy with the South and familiar with the mountain paths, had made a trip to an elevated point where he could clearly see the Federal position, and reported his observations to General Lee. Afterward he made a second reconnoissance, accompanied by Colonel Albert Rust, of the Third Arkansas Regiment, who was anxious to see the nature of the ground and the strength of the position for himself. They reported to General Lee that in their opinion the enemy's position could be assailed with success with troops which could be guided to the point they had reached. General Lee decided to make the attack, and gave to Rust a column of 1,200 infantry. ... The movement was to begin at night, which happened to be a very rainy one. All the troops, however, got in the positions assigned to them without the knowledge of the enemy, where they waited, every moment expecting to hear the rattle of Rust's muskets, who had been charged with the capture of the pass on Cheat Mountain; but hour after hour passed, and no sounds were heard. After a delay of many hours, and the enemy had divined the nature of the attack, the troops were ordered back to their former position. There had been only a small conflict between cavalry, in which Colonel John A. Washington, General Lee's aid-de-camp, who had been sent with Major W. H. F. Lee to reconnoiter the enemy, was killed from an ambuscade. ... Rust claims in his reports that spies had communicated the movements of the Confederate troops to the enemy. This officer evidently did not attack, because he found, on getting close to the Federal position, that it was much stronger than he had thought it was from the preliminary reconnoissances he had made. As the attack of the whole depended on the assault of this force, the failure to attack caused a corresponding failure of the whole movement. ... This movement having failed, and knowing that the enemy would be prepared for any second attempt which, from the nature of the country, would have to be similar to the one already tried, General Lee decided to turn his attention to the commands of Wise and Floyd in front of Rosecrans, leaving General H. R. Jackson in Reynolds's front. He proceeded at once to Floyd's command, which he reached on September 20th, and then to Wise's camp, closely inspecting both. He at once perceived that Wise's position was the strongest and offered the best means for successful defense, and promptly concentrated his forces at that point. ... Rosecrans had advanced to the top of Big Sewell Mountain and had placed his army in a strong position. General Lee, with te troops of Wise, Floyd, and Loring--about 8,000 men--occupied a position on a parallel range. The two armies were now in close proximity to each other, both occupying strong defensive positions. Lee and Rosecrans, having been officers of the engineers, were fully aware of the great disadvantage an attacking army would have, and each waited, hoping the other would attack. After occupying these positions for twelve days, Rosecrans, on the night of October 6th, retreated. The condition of the roads, the mud, the swollen streams, the large numbers of men with typhoid fever and measles, the condition of the horses, of the artillery, and transportation, were such that Lee decided not to pursue. ... The rapid approach of winter and the rainy season terminated the campaign in this section. ... At the termination of this campaign of General Lee's the Confederate Government did not bestow much attention upon this section. The majority of the people seemed inclined to support the Federal side. ... It must be admitted that General Lee retired from West Virginia with diminished military reputation. Great results had been expected from his presence there. Garnett's defeat and death were to be avenged, and the whole of that portion of Virginia speedily wrested from the Federal arms. The public did not understand the difficulties of the situation, or comprehend why he did not defeat Reynolds, or the failure to attack Rosecrans."

After Lee left General H. R. Jackson in front of Reynolds' position, the former established himself in a fortified camp on Buffalo Hill, and was unsuccessfully attacked there by Reynolds, October 3. Two months later, on the 13th of December, the attack was repeated by Reynolds' successor in command, General Milroy, and again without success. Meantime, Floyd had been driven into the mountains, with little fighting, by Rosecrans, and military operations, for the time, were at an end.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . General Grant's first battle, at Belmont.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . Confederate project for the invasion of the North vetoed by Jefferson Davis.

"Between the 4th of August and the 15th of October more than 110 regiments and thirty batteries, comprising at least 100,000 men, were added to the forces in Washington and its neighborhood, and there appeared to be no limit to the resources and patriotism of the North. Moreover, the Northern troops were so well provided for in all respects, owing to the immense resources at the disposal of the United States Government, that there was every reason to expect in the spring of 1862 a decidedly improved condition in health and vigor, in self-confidence, and in all soldierly qualities, on the part of the soldiers. The army at Manassas, on the other hand, owing to the straitened means of the Confederate Government, was barely kept comfortable in the matter of clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter. ... It was easy for any one instructed in military matters to see that if the Federal authorities would only be content to defer active operations until the patriotic levies of the North should have learned 'the trade of the soldier,'--should have acquired familiarity with the use of arms, habits of obedience, trust in their officers and superiors, discipline,--the Federal general would enter on the next campaign with all those chances of success which attend largely superior numbers, better arms and equipment, and a sound and thorough organization of his army. Such in fact was the view of the situation taken by the sagacious officer who commanded the lately victorious army at Manassas Junction, Joseph E. Johnston. In his opinion his two corps commanders, Beauregard ... and G. W. Smith, ... entirely concurred. They saw that something must be done to break up this constantly increasing Federal army while it was yet in the process of formation. The Confederate generals determined to urge their views upon the President of the Southern Confederacy. Mr. Davis responded at once to their expressed wish for a conference upon the military situation, and he reached Manassas on September 30, 1861. The conference was held the next day. The generals strongly advised Mr. Davis to reinforce the army at Manassas so that they might cross the Potomac, cut the communications of Washington with the North, and carry the war into the enemy's country. Johnston and Beauregard fixed the strength of an army adequate to these tasks at 60,000 men. Smith was content with a force of 50,000. Additional transportation and supplies of ammunition were also demanded. The army then at Manassas numbered about 40,000 men. With the quality of the soldiers the generals seemed to be perfectly content. They only asked that the additional troops sent should be of an equal degree of efficiency,--'seasoned soldiers' as distinguished from 'fresh volunteers.' But President Davis decided that he could not furnish the required reinforcement without 'a total disregard of the safety of other threatened positions.' The project was therefore dropped, and no further attempt was made during the ensuing autumn and winter to interfere with the uninterrupted development of the Federal army at and near Washington in organization and efficiency. ... It is altogether probable that the Confederate army was at that time decidedly the superior of its antagonist in many important respects. It had the prestige of victory. ... We may fairly say therefore, that an invasion of the North, undertaken in October, 1861, held out a very fair promise of a successful result for the Confederate arms."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . The affair at Ball's Bluff, or Leesburg.

"The true story of the affair of Ball's Bluff, is, in brief, as follows: One of General Stone's officers, Captain Philbrick, of the 15th Massachusetts, thought that he had discovered a camp of the enemy about one mile beyond Harrison's island in the direction of Leesburg. Having completed the feint of crossing made in the course of the 20th, General Stone at 10.30 P. M. of the same day issued his orders for the surprise of the supposed camp at daybreak of the 21st. Colonel Devens, of the 15th Massachusetts, was entrusted with the duty, with four companies of his regiment. Colonel Lee, of the 20th Massachusetts, was directed to replace Colonel Devens in Harrison's island with four companies of his own regiment, one of which was to pass over to the Virginia shore and hold the heights there to cover Colonel Devens's return. Colonel Devens was directed to 'attack the camp at daybreak, and, having routed, to pursue them as far as he deems prudent, and to destroy the camp, if practicable, before returning.' ... Having accomplished this duty, Colonel Devens will return to his present position, unless he shall see one on the Virginia side near the river which he can undoubtedly hold until reinforced, and one which can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In which case he will hold on and report.' In obedience to these orders Colonel Devens crossed about midnight with five companies , numbering about 300 men, and halted until daybreak in an open field near the bluffs bordering the shore. While there he was joined by Colonel Lee with 100 men of the 20th Massachusetts, who halted here to cover his return. At daybreak he advanced about a mile towards Leesburg, and then discovered that the supposed camp did not exist. After examining the vicinity and discovering no traces of the enemy, he determined not to return at once, but at about half-past six A. M. sent a non-commissioned officer to report to General Stone that he thought he could remain where he was until reinforced. At about seven o'clock a company of hostile riflemen were observed on the right, and a slight skirmish ensued. A company of cavalry being soon observed on the left, the skirmishers were drawn back to the woods, and, after waiting half an hour for attack, the command was withdrawn to the position held by Colonel Lee; but, after again scouting the woods, Colonel Devens returned to his advanced position. About eight o'clock the messenger returned from General Stone with orders for Colonel Devens to remain where he was, and that he would be reinforced. The messenger was again sent back to report the skirmish that had taken place. Colonel Devens then threw out skirmishers and awaited reinforcements. At about ten o'clock the messenger again returned with the information that Colonel Baker would soon arrive with his brigade and take command. Between nine and eleven Colonel Devens was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Learned with the remainder of the 15th. bringing up his command to 28 officers and 625 men. About midday Colonel Devens learned that the enemy were gathering on his left, and about half-past twelve or one he was strongly attacked; and as he was in great danger of being outflanked, and no reinforcements had arrived, at about a quarter-past two he fell back to the bluff, where he found Colonel Baker, who directed him to take the right of the position he proposed to occupy. ... At about three o'clock the enemy attacked in force, the weight of his attack being on our centre and left. At about four our artillery was silenced, and Colonel Devens was ordered to send two of his companies to support the left of our line; shortly after he learned that Colonel Baker had been killed. Colonel Coggswell then assumed command, and, after a vain attempt to cut his way through to Edward's Ferry, was obliged to give the order to retreat to the river-bank and direct the men to save themselves as best they could. I have gone thus much into detail because at the time I was much criticised and blamed for this unfortunate affair, while I was in no sense responsible for it."

In connection with the disaster at Ball's Bluff a great wrong seems to have been done to General Stone. Accused of disloyalty, he was arrested, but on no specific charge, imprisoned for six months, denied a trial, and set free without explanation. He went abroad and for many years was Chief of the General Staff to the Khedive of Egypt.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . The Port Royal Expedition. Capture of Hilton Head. Extensive occupation of the coast. Savannah threatened.

"The effect of the battle of Port Royal was as largely felt in the North, where it revived the hopes of her people, as in the South, to whose people it revealed the presence of a new and pressing danger. The Federals had conquered a strong base of operations on the enemy's coast; they had carried the war into South Carolina. ... Sherman might, perhaps, at the first moment of his adversary's disorder, have been able to push his success farther, and to lead his army upon Charleston, or Savannah. But he was afraid of risking such a venture. ... The occupation of most of the islands in the vicinity of the St. Helena group was the natural consequence of the victory of Hilton Head. It was effected gradually before the end of the year. Among all the points of the coast which the Federals had thus seized without striking a blow, thanks to the prestige of their success, the most important was Tybee Island, at the entrance of the Savannah River. Situated on the right bank of the mouth of that river, and being the spot where the lighthouse stands, Tybee Island enabled the Federals, as soon as they became masters of it, to obstruct the passage of the blockade-runners on their way to the great mart of Savannah. At a distance of about 600 feet from its borders, on an islet in the middle of the river, stood Fort Pulaski. ... A few days after, the navy extended its conquests still farther south," occupying the channel between the Tybee Island group and the Warsaw Islands, "and thus opening a passage for future operations, which would enable them to reach Savannah by turning Fort Pulaski. ... At the end of the year, Dupont's fleet, supported by detachments from Sherman's army, was in possession of the five large bays of North Edisto, St. Helena, Port Royal, Tybee, Warsaw, and the whole chain of islands which forms the coast of Carolina and Georgia between those bays."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 . The Trent affair. Arrest of Mason and Slidell.

"On the 8th of November, 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes, of the United States Steamer San Jacinto, intercepted on the ocean H. B. M. mail packet boat Trent, having on board four rebel emissaries bound for England. Having boarded the Trent, an officer of the San Jacinto, with an armed guard, arrested the rebels Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis, and transferred them to the San Jacinto. The Trent then proceeded on her voyage. Captain Wilkes conveyed his captives to Boston, where they were consigned to Fort Warren, then a receptacle for political prisoners. When this transaction became known to the British government, immediate preparations were made for war. In the United States, the act was hailed as a victory. The Secretary of the Navy publicly applauded Captain Wilkes, and the House of Representatives did the same. The Secretary of State, upon whom the chief responsibility in the matter rested, saw, more clearly than others, that a breach of international law had been committed by the commander of the San Jacinto. The President coincided with Mr. Seward, and it was at once resolved to restore the rebel captives to the protection of the British flag."

In his diplomatic correspondence as quoted in the volume cited above, under the caption "Diary or Notes on the War," Secretary Seward wrote:

"November 30, 1861.--Captain Wilkes, in the Steamer San Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer, and taken from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on an errand of treason against their own country. Lord Lyons has prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by the British government should be first made to us here, and that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here. In the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the government, the subject is therefore free from the embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been specially directed by us. ...

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862 . Protracted inaction of McClellan. His Plan of Campaign and its frustration by the rebel evacuation of Centreville.

"When Congress assembled ... in the beginning of December, 1861, so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and so zealously had the people responded to their country's call, that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your committee by the adjutant general of the army, showed that, exclusive of the command of General Dix, at Baltimore, the army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men. During the time this large army had been collecting and organizing, nothing of importance had transpired in connexion with it, except the closing of the navigation of the Potomac by the rebels, which your committee treat of more at length in another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of Ball's Bluff, which is made the subject of a separate report. The weather during the fall season, and for some weeks after the convening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for active military operations. As month after month passed without anything being done by the army of the Potomac, the people became more and more anxious for the announcement that the work of preparation had been completed and active operations would soon be commenced. From the testimony before your committee it appeared that the army of the Potomac was well armed and equipped, and had reached a high state of discipline by the last of September or the first of October. The men were ready and eager to commence active operations. The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed to going into winter quarters, and the most of them declared they had no expectation of doing so. ... Your committee endeavored to obtain as accurate information, as possible in relation to the strength and position of the enemy in front of Washington. The testimony of the officers in our army here upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Early in December an order had been issued from headquarters prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any persons who should come into our lines from the direction of the enemy; but all such persons were to be sent, without examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was, that the generals examined appeared to be almost entirely ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having only such information as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon information received at headquarters. ... Subsequent events have proved that the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very greatly overestimated. Your committee also sought to ascertain what number of men could be spared from this army for offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the works of the enemy in front were of such a character that it would not be advisable to move directly upon them. The estimate of the force necessary to be left in and around Washington to act entirely on the defensive, to render the capital secure against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses examined upon that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men, leaving 100,000 or upwards that could be used for expeditions at other points. ... The subject of the obstruction of the navigation of the Potomac naturally demanded the consideration of your committee. ... As was well urged by the Navy Department, the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army co-operate with the navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed. After repeated efforts, General McClellan promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to proceed down the river. ... The troops did not arrive, and the Navy Department was informed of the fact by Captain Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of General McClellan why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he had concluded not to send them. Captain Fox replied that the landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy Department had charge. ... It was then agreed that the troops should be sent the next night. Captain Craven was again notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose. Captain Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the committee as to what reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as he could ascertain, was, that General McClellan feared it might bring on a general engagement. ... Upon the failure of this plan of the Navy Department, the effective vessels of the Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter closed, and remained closed until the rebels voluntarily evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening communication by that route. On the 19th of January, 1862, the President of the United States, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the armies of the United States, one result of which was the series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every loyal man in the land. After this long period of inaction of the army of the Potomac, the President of the United States, on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following order: ... 'Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the general-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next. Abraham Lincoln.'

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, consisting of Senators Wade, Chandler, and Andrew Johnson, and of Representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell, was appointed in December, 1861. This Committee "was for four years one of the most important agencies in the country. It assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of both the army and the Government; it called soldiers and statesmen before it, and questioned them like refractory schoolboys. ... It was often hasty and unjust in its judgments, but always, earnest, patriotic, and honest. ... General McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee with something like contempt. But the President, with his larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take into account an agency of such importance; and though he steadily defended General McClellan and his deliberateness of preparation before the committee, he constantly assured him in private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself in readiness for a forward movement. ... December was the fifth month that General McClellan had been in command of the greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was impossible to convince the country that a longer period of preparation was necessary before this army could be led against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in discipline or equipment. ... McClellan reported to the Secretary of War, that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered 150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of 240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective total of 41,000 men. ... Aware that his army was less than one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the time in drilling and disciplining his troops, who, according to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military operations, he says, were practicable until the end of December; but he was never molested."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862 . Jackson's first campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. Battle of Kernstown.

"Soon after the battle of Bull Run Stonewall Jackson was promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac District, and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes," In November, Jackson's force was about 10,000 men. "His only movement of note in the winter of 1861-62 was an expedition at the end of December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and a dam or two near Hancock, on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. ... In March Johnston withdrew from Manassas, and General McClellan collected his army of more than 100,000 men on the Peninsula. ... Jackson's little army in the Valley had been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so that at the beginning of March he did not have over 5,000 men of all arms available for the defense of his district, which began to swarm with enemies all around its borders, aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy had begun to withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to cooperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by an aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8,000 to 10,000 men. A little after the middle of March, Jack?son concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23d he occupied a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles south of Winchester. Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham county. The pursuit was not vigorous nor persistent. Although Jackson retired before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting qualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops from the Valley. The result was so pleasing to the Richmond government and General Johnston that it was decided to re?nforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division to him at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1863. President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus.

On the 27th of April, 1861, President Lincoln issued the following order "To the Commanding General, Army of the United States"--at that time, General Scott: "You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ." On the 2d of July, another order was issued in exactly the same language, except that it gave authority to suspend the writ at "any point on or in the vicinity of any military line ... between the city of New York and the city of Washington." On the 14th of October, a third order to General Scott declared: "The military line of the United States for the suppression of the insurrection may be extended so far as Bangor, Maine. You and any officer acting under your authority are hereby authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any place between that place and the city of Washington." On the 2d of December a specific order to General Halleck, commanding in the Department of Missouri, authorized the suspension of the writ within the limits of his command; and a similar order, long previously, had specially empowered the commander of the forces of the United States on the coast of Florida to do the same. On the 24th of September, 1862, a general proclamation by the President subjected to martial law "all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States"; and suspending the writ of habeas corpus "in respect to all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or military commission." On the 3d of March, 1863, the authority of the President to suspend habeas corpus was confirmed by act of Congress; and on the 15th of September in that year another general proclamation was issued, referring to the act and declaring a suspension of the writ "throughout the United States, in the cases where, by the authority of the President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of them, hold persons under their command, or in their custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or drafted or mustered or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval service by authority of the President of the United States; or for resisting a draft, or for any other offense against the military or naval service."

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