|
Read Ebook: Jurisprudence by Salmond John W
Font size: Background color: Text color: Add to tbrJar First Page Next PageEbook has 1232 lines and 103862 words, and 25 pagesINDEX 497 JURISPRUDENCE. In the widest of its applications the term jurisprudence means the science of law, using the word law in that vague and general sense in which it includes all species of obligatory rules of human action. Of jurisprudence in this sense, there are as many divisions as there are kinds of law which have been deemed sufficiently important and well developed to serve as the subject-matter of distinct branches of learning. They are at least three in number: In a second and narrower sense, jurisprudence, instead of including all three of the foregoing divisions, is limited to one only, namely, that which we have distinguished as civil. It is the science of civil law. A similar specific application belongs to the term law also, for when we speak of law without any qualifying epithet, we commonly mean that particular form which is administered in the tribunals of the state. So when we speak of jurisprudence without more, we usually intend the science of this special kind of law and this alone. Opinions may well differ to some extent as to the matters which are fit, by reason of their generality or their theoretic and scientific interest, to find a place among the contents of abstract jurisprudence. Speaking generally, however, it may be said that this science appropriately deals with such matters as the following: The divisions of legal science, as they have been stated and explained in the foregoing pages, may be exhibited in tabular form as follows: Possession } The three beneficial relations between persons and rights. Encumbrance } .nf l .nf l The kinds of Ownership. In the whole range of legal theory there is no conception more difficult than that of possession. The Roman lawyers brought their usual acumen to the analysis of it, and since their day the problem has formed the subject of a voluminous literature, while it still continues to tax the ingenuity of jurists. Nor is the question one of mere curiosity or scientific interest, for its practical importance is not less than its difficulty. The legal consequences which flow from the acquisition and loss of possession are many and serious. Possession, for example, is evidence of ownership; the possessor of a thing is presumed to be the owner of it, and may put all other claimants to proof of their title. Long possession is a sufficient title even to property which originally belonged to another. The transfer of possession is one of the chief methods of transferring ownership. The first possession of a thing which as yet belongs to no one is a good title of right. Even in respect of property already owned, the wrongful possession of it is a good title for the wrongdoer, as against all the world except the true owner. Possession is of such efficacy, also, that a possessor may in many cases confer a good title on another, even though he has none himself; as when I obtain a bank-note from a thief, or goods from a factor who disposes of them in fraud of his principal. These are some, though some only, of the results which the law attributes to possession, rightful or wrongful. They are sufficient to show the importance of this conception, and the necessity of an adequate analysis of its essential nature. In consequence of this divergence, partly intentional and avowed, partly accidental and unavowed, between the law and the fact of possession, it is impossible that any abstract theory should completely harmonise with the detailed rules to be found in any concrete body of law. Such harmony would be possible only in a legal system which had developed with absolute logical rigour, undisturbed by historical accidents, and unaffected by any of those special considerations which in all parts of the law prevent the inflexible and consistent recognition of general principles. It follows from this discordance between law and fact, that a complete theory of possession falls into two parts: first an analysis of the conception itself, and secondly an exposition of the manner in which it is recognised and applied in the actual legal system. It is with the first of those matters that we are here alone concerned. The complexities of the English law are increased by the curious circumstance that two distinct kinds of legal possession are recognised in that system. These are distinguished as seisin and possession. To a considerable extent they are governed by different rules and have different effects. I may have seisin of a piece of land but not possession of it, or possession but not seisin, or both at once; and in all those cases I may or may not at the same time have possession in fact. The doctrine of seisin is limited to land; it is one of the curiosities of that most curious of the products of the human intellect, the English law of real property. The doctrine of possession, on the other hand, is common, with certain variations, to land and chattels. The divergence between these two forms of possession in law is a matter of legal history, not of legal theory. Extraordinary importance was until a comparatively recent period attributed by our law to the acquisition and retention of seisin by the owner of land. Without seisin his right was a mere shadow of ownership, rather than the full reality of it. For many purposes a man had only what he possessed--and the form of his possession must be that which amounted to seisin. A dispossessed owner was deprived of his most effective remedies; he could neither alienate his estate, nor leave it by his will; neither did his heirs inherit it after him. The tendency of modern law is to eliminate the whole doctrine of seisin, as an archaic survival of an earlier process of thought, and to recognise a single form of legal possession. Corporeal possession is clearly some form of continuing relation between a person and a material object. It is equally clear that it is a relation of fact and not one of right. It may be, and commonly is, a title of right; but it is not a right itself. A man may possess a thing in defiance of the law, no less than in accordance with it. Nor is this in any way inconsistent with the proposition, already considered by us, that possession may be such either in law or in fact. A thief has possession in law, although he has acquired it contrary to law. The law condemns his possession as wrongful, but at the same time recognises that it exists, and attributes to it most, if not all, of the ordinary consequences of possession. That this is so in law, no less than in fact, appears from the following cases:-- There are, however, certain cases which seem to indicate that the possessor of land possesses whatever is in it or under it. Some amount of difficulty or even uncertainty in coming to the enjoyment of a thing is not inconsistent with the present possession of it. My cattle have strayed, but they will probably be found. My dog is away from home, but he will probably return. I have mislaid a book, but it is somewhere within my house and can be found with a little trouble. These things, therefore, I still possess, though I cannot lay my hands on them at will. I have with respect to them a reasonable and confident expectation of enjoyment. But if a wild bird escapes from its cage, or a thing is hopelessly mislaid, whether in my house or out of it, I have lost possession of it. Such a loss of the proper relation to the thing itself is very often at the same time the loss of the proper relation to other persons. Thus if I drop a shilling in the street, I lose possession on both grounds. It is very unlikely that I shall find it myself, and it is very likely that some passer-by will discover and appropriate it. The second kind of mediate possession is that in which the direct possession is in one who holds both on my account and on his own, but who recognises my superior right to obtain from him the direct possession whenever I choose to demand it. That is to say, it is the case of a borrower, hirer, or tenant at will. I do not lose possession of a thing because I have lent it to some one who acknowledges my title to it and is prepared to return it to me on demand, and who in the meantime holds it and looks after it on my behalf. There is no difference in this respect between entrusting a thing to a servant or agent and entrusting it to a borrower. Through the one, as well as through the other, I retain as regards all other persons a due security for the use and enjoyment of my property. I myself possess whatever is possessed for me on those terms by another. To put the matter in a general form, prescription runs in favour of the immediate against the mediate possessor, but in favour of the mediate possessor as against third persons. Hitherto we have limited our attention to the case of corporeal possession. We have now to consider incorporeal, and to seek the generic conception which includes both these forms. For I may possess not the land itself, but a way over it, or the access of light from it, or the support afforded by it to my land which adjoins it. So also I may possess powers, privileges, immunities, liberties, offices, dignities, services, monopolies. All these things may be possessed as well as owned. They may be possessed by one man, and owned by another. They may be owned and not possessed, or possessed and not owned. Corporeal possession is, as we have seen, the continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of a material object. Incorporeal possession is the continuing exercise of a claim to anything else. The thing so claimed may be either the non-exclusive use of a material object or some interest or advantage unconnected with the use of material objects . We may note finally that, although incorporeal possession is possible in fact of all continuing rights, it by no means follows that the recognition of such possession, or the attribution of legal consequences to it, is necessary or profitable in law. To what extent incorporeal possession exists in law, and what consequences flow from it, are questions which are not here relevant, but touch merely the details of the legal system. In English law possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who retakes his own, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law. This duplication of remedies, with the resulting provisional protection of possession, has its beginnings in Roman law. It was taken up into the canon law, where it received considerable extensions, and through the canon law it became a prominent feature of medieval jurisprudence. It is still received in modern Continental systems; but although well known to the earlier law of England, it has been long since rejected by us as cumbrous and unnecessary. There has been much discussion as to the reasons on which this provisional protection of possession is based. It would seem probable that the considerations of greatest weight are the three following. Possession Transfer of Rights. Vestitive Facts Transfer of Rights. Corporeal property Property Incorporeal property The second class of restrictions upon an owner's right of use consists of those which flow from the existence of encumbrances vested in other persons. These are artificial limits which may or may not exist. My land may be mortgaged, leased, charged, bound by restrictive covenants, and so on, yet I remain the owner of it none the less. For I am still entitled to the residue of its uses, and whatever right over it is not specifically vested in some one else is vested in me. The residuary use so left to me may be of very small dimensions; some encumbrancer may own rights over it much more valuable than mine; but the ownership of it is in me and not in him. Were his right to determine to-morrow in any manner, my own, relieved from the encumbrance which now weighs it down, would forthwith spring up to its full stature and have again its full effect. No right loses its identity because of an encumbrance vested in some one else. That which is a right of ownership when there are no encumbrances, remains a right of ownership notwithstanding any number of them. Inasmuch as the right of ownership is a right to the aggregate of the uses of the thing, it follows that ownership is necessarily permanent. No person having merely a temporary right to the use of a thing can be the owner of the thing, however general that right may be while it lasts. He who comes after him is the owner; for it is to him that the residue of the uses of the thing pertains. It is to be understood, however, that by a permanent right is meant nothing more than a right which is capable of lasting as long as the thing itself which is its subject-matter, however long or short that duration may be. Even as the generality of ownership involves its permanence, so its permanence involves the further essential feature of inheritance. The only permanent rights which can be owned by a mortal man are those which can be handed down by him to his successors or representatives on his death. All others are temporary, their duration being necessarily limited to the lifetime of him in whom they are vested. The right of ownership, therefore, is essentially an inheritable right. It is capable of surviving its owner for the time being. It belongs to the class of rights which are divested by death but are not extinguished by it. Summing up the conclusions to which we have attained, we may define the right of ownership in a material thing as the general, permanent, and inheritable right to the uses of that thing. This distinction, however, between the fee simple of land and the ownership of it is a matter of form rather than of substance. In fact, if not in legal theory, the right of a tenant in fee simple is permanent; for escheat takes place only on an intestacy, and therefore can be prevented by the act of the tenant. We are at liberty, therefore, to disregard this technicality of real property law, and to speak of the fee simple of land as the ownership of it, the right of the Crown being viewed, accordingly, not as vested and continuing ownership subject to an encumbrance, but as a contingent right of succession to an intestate owner. Among material things the most important distinction is that between movables and immovables, or, to use terms more familiar in English law, between chattels and land. In all legal systems these two classes of objects are to some extent governed by different rules, though in no system is the difference so great as in our own. Considered in its legal aspect, an immovable, that is to say, a piece of land, includes the following elements:-- The leading principle as to the local situation of rights is that they are situated where they are exercised and enjoyed. Rights over material things, therefore, have the same situation as those things themselves. The good-will of a business is situated in the place where the business is carried on. Debts are in general situated in the place where the debtor resides, since it is there that the creditor must go to get his money. In connexion with the distinctions between movable and immovable, and between real and personal property, we must notice the legal significance of the term chattel. This word has apparently three different meanings in English law:-- Although a lease of land and a bailment of chattels are transactions of essentially the same nature, there is no term which, in its recognised use, is sufficiently wide to include both. The term bailment is never applied to the tenancy of land, and although the term lease is not wholly inapplicable in the case of chattels, its use in this connexion is subject to arbitrary limitations. It is necessary, therefore, in the interests of orderly classification, to do some violence to received usage, in adopting the term lease as a generic expression to include not merely the tenancy of land, but all kinds of bailments of chattels, and all encumbrances of incorporeal property which possess the same essential nature as a tenancy of land. A lease, in this generic sense, is that form of encumbrance which consists in a right to the possession and use of property owned by some other person. It is the outcome of the rightful separation of ownership and possession. We have seen that possession is the continuing exercise of a right, and that although a right is normally exercised by the owner of it, it may in special cases be exercised by some one else. This separation of ownership and possession may be either rightful or wrongful, and if rightful it is an encumbrance of the owner's title. Is it essential that a lease should be of less duration than the right which is subject to it? This is almost invariably the case; land is leased for a term of years or for life, but not in perpetuity; the owner of a thing owns it for ever, but the lessee of it possesses it for a time. We may be tempted, therefore, to regard this difference of duration as essential, and to define a lease as a right to the temporary exercise of a right vested in some one else. But this is not so. There is no objection in principle to a lease of land in perpetuity, or to a lease of a patent or copyright for the full term of its existence. It may be objected that a lease of this description would not be a true lease or encumbrance at all, but an assignment of the right itself; that the grantee would become the owner of the right, and not a mere encumbrancer; and in favour of this contention it may be pointed out that a sub-lease for the whole term is construed in English law as an assignment of the term, a sub-lease being necessarily shorter than the term, if only by a single day. Whatever the actual rule of English law may be, however, there is nothing in legal theory to justify us in asserting that any such difference of duration is essential to the existence of a true lease. A lease exists whenever the rightful possession of a thing is separated from the ownership of it; and although this separation is usually temporary, there is no difficulty in supposing it permanent. I may own a permanent right to exercise another right, without owning the latter right itself. The ownership may remain dormant, deprived of any right of exercise and enjoyment, in the hands of the lessor. I am not necessarily the owner of a patent, because I have acquired by contract with the owner a right to the exclusive use of it during the whole term of its duration. So far as legal principle is concerned, I may still remain the owner of a lease, although I may have granted a sub-lease to another for the whole residue of the term. To assign a lease and to sublet it for the whole term are in the intention of the parties and in legal theory two entirely different transactions. The assignment is a substitution of one tenant for another, the assignor retaining no rights whatever. The sub-lease, on the contrary, is designed to leave the original relation of landlord and tenant untouched, the sub-lessee being the tenant of the lessee and not of the original lessor. A servitude is that form of encumbrance which consists in a right to the limited use of a piece of land without the possession of it; for example, a right of way over it, a right to the passage of light across it to the windows of a house on the adjoining land, a right to depasture cattle upon it, or a right to derive support from it for the foundations of an adjoining building. It is an essential characteristic of a servitude that it does not involve the possession of the land over which it exists. This is the difference between a servitude and a lease. A lease of land is the rightful possession and use without the ownership of it, while a servitude over land is the rightful use without either the ownership or the possession of it. There are two distinct methods in which I may acquire a road across another man's property. I may agree with him for the exclusive possession of a defined strip of the land; or I may agree with him for the use of such a strip for the sole purpose of passage, without any exclusive possession or occupation of it. In the first case I acquire a lease; in the second a servitude. Servitudes are of two kinds, which may be distinguished as private and public. A private servitude is one vested in a determinate individual; for example, a right of way, of light, or of support, vested in the owner of one piece of land over an adjoining piece, or a right granted to one person of fishing in the water of another, or of mining in another's land. A public servitude is one vested in the public at large or in some class of indeterminate individuals; for example, the right of the public to a highway over land in private ownership, the right of the public to navigate a river of which the bed belongs to some private person, the right of the inhabitants of a parish to use a certain piece of private ground for the purposes of recreation. Servitudes are further distinguishable in the language of English law as being either appurtenant or in gross. A servitude appurtenant is one which is not merely an encumbrance of one piece of land, but is also accessory to another piece. It is a right of using one piece for the benefit of another; as in the case of a right of way from A.'s house to the high road across B.'s field, or a right of support for a building, or a right to the access of light to a window. The land which is burdened with such a servitude is called the servient land or tenement; that which has the benefit of it is called the dominant land or tenement. The servitude runs with each of the tenements into the hands of successive owners and occupiers. Both the benefit and the burden of it are concurrent with the ownership of the lands concerned. A servitude is said to be in gross, on the other hand, when it is not so attached and accessory to any dominant tenement for whose benefit it exists. An example is a public right of way or of navigation or of recreation, or a private right of fishing, pasturage, or mining. Speaking generally, any alienable and valuable right whatever may be the subject-matter of a mortgage. Whatever can be transferred can be transferred by way of mortgage; whatever can be encumbered can be encumbered by way of mortgage. Whether I own land, or chattels, or debts, or shares, or patents, or copyrights, or leases, or servitudes, or equitable interests in trust funds, or the benefit of a contract, I may so deal with them as to constitute a valid mortgage security. Even a mortgage itself may be transferred by the mortgagee to some creditor of his own by way of mortgage, such a mortgage of a mortgage being known as a sub-mortgage. Liens are of various kinds, none of which present any difficulty or require any special consideration. On the other hand, the thing of which possession is taken may already be the property of some one else. In this case the title acquired by possession is good, indeed, against all third persons, but is of no validity at all against the true owner. Possession, even when consciously wrongful, is allowed as a title of right against all persons who cannot show a better, because a prior, title in themselves. Save with respect to the rights of the original proprietor, my rights to the watch in my pocket are much the same, whether I bought it honestly, or found it, or abstracted it from the pocket of some one else. If it is stolen from me, the law will help me to the recovery of it. I can effectually sell it, lend it, give it away, or bequeath it, and it will go on my death intestate to my next of kin. Whoever acquires it from me, however, acquires in general nothing save my limited and imperfect title to it, and holds it, as I do, subject to the superior claims of the original owner. A thing owned by one man and thus adversely possessed by another has in truth two owners. The ownership of the one is absolute and perfect, while that of the other is relative and imperfect, and is often called, by reason of its origin in possession, possessory ownership. In many cases the two forms of prescription coincide. The property which one person loses through long dispossession is often at the same time acquired by some one else through long possession. Yet this is not always so, and it is necessary in many instances to know whether legal effect is given to long possession, in which case the prescription is positive, or to long want of possession, in which case the prescription is negative. I may, for example, be continuously out of possession of my land for twelve years, without any other single person having continuously held possession of it for that length of time. It may have been in the hands of a series of trespassers against me and against each other. In this case, if the legally recognised form of prescription is positive, it is inoperative, and I retain my ownership. But if the law recognises negative prescription instead of positive my title will be extinguished. Who in such circumstances will acquire the right which I thus lose, depends not on the law of prescription, but on the rules as to the acquisition of things which have no owner. The doctrine that prior possession is a good title against all but the true owner, will confer on the first of a series of adverse possessors a good title against all the world so soon as the title of the true owner has been extinguished by negative prescription. If, therefore, I am in possession of anything in which I claim a right, I have evidence of my right which differs from all other evidence, inasmuch as it grows stronger instead of weaker with the lapse of years. The tooth of time may eat away all other proofs of title. Documents are lost, memory fails, witnesses die. But as these become of no avail, an efficient substitute is in the same measure provided by the probative force of long possession. So also with long want of possession as evidence of want of title; as the years pass, the evidence in favour of the title fades, while the presumption against it grows ever stronger. Here, then, we have the chief foundation of the law of prescription. For in this case, as in so many others, the law has deemed it expedient to confer upon a certain species of evidence conclusive force. It has established a conclusive presumption in favour of the rightfulness of long possession, and against the validity of claims which are vitiated by long want of possession. Lapse of time is recognised as creative and destructive of rights, instead of merely as evidence for and against their existence. In substance, though not always in form, prescription has been advanced from the law of evidence to a place in the substantive law. An example of perfect prescription is the destruction of the ownership of land through dispossession for twelve years. The owner of land who has been out of possession for that period does not merely lose his right of action for the recovery of it, but also loses the right of ownership itself. An example of imperfect prescription, on the other hand, is the case of the owner of a chattel who has been out of possession of it for six years. He loses his right of action for the recovery of it, but he remains the owner of it none the less. His ownership is reduced from a perfect to an imperfect right, but it still subsists. Similarly a creditor loses in six years his right of action for the debt; but the debt itself is not extinguished, and continues to be due and owing. We have already considered the general theory of agreement as a title of right. It will be remembered that we used the term to include not merely contracts but all other bilateral acts in the law, that is to say, all expressions of the consenting wills of two or more persons directed to an alteration of their legal relations. Agreement in this wide sense is no less important in the law of property than in that of obligations. Add to tbrJar First Page Next Page |
Terms of Use Stock Market News! © gutenberg.org.in2024 All Rights reserved.